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Ethnic Profiling by Police 
in Europe: An Overview of the 
Justice Initiative Project
In 2005, the Open Society Justice Initiative, which works around the globe to foster 
rights-based law reform, launched an effort to address ethnic profiling by police in 
Europe. The Justice Initiative was concerned, on the one hand, by long-standing alle-
gations of police discrimination against Roma and members of other visible minori-
ties in the course of ordinary crime prevention activities and, on the other, by new 
reports about the targeting of Muslims by law enforcement officers engaged in the 
fight against terrorism. 
The term “ethnic profiling” refers to the use, by law enforcement officers, of 
ethnic or racial stereotypes as a basis for decisions about who may be involved in 
criminal or terrorist activity. Although ethnic profiling is widespread, the practice 
has been insufficiently studied. Because ethnic profiling constitutes discrimination, 
it breaches fundamental human rights norms, but it has not been expressly outlawed 
by any European government. To date, no European countries other than the United 
Kingdom collect information on ethnicity and police stop and search practices. Profil-
ing is also counterproductive. It misdirects law enforcement resources and alienates 
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some of the very people whose cooperation is necessary for effective crime detection. 
Without hard qualitative and quantitative information about its extent, however, eth-
nic profiling can be neither addressed nor corrected. 
Recognizing these challenges, and working in partnership with local and 
regional institutions, the Justice Initiative’s project is pursuing three principal 
objectives: 
 To make law enforcement officers, human rights advocates, policymakers, and 
the general public more aware of the prevalence and effects of ethnic profiling 
by engaging in research, documentation, and other activities
 To secure the adoption of pan-European and national legal norms that explicitly 
ban ethnic profiling as a manifestation of particularly egregious discriminatory 
conduct
 To support national civil society and law enforcement agencies in efforts to work 
jointly in developing and applying good practices to monitor police behavior 
and eliminate ethnic profiling and other discriminatory practices
Since January 2005, the Justice Initiative has worked on several fronts. First, in 
cooperation with the police and NGOs in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Spain, the Justice 
Initiative carried out interview-based research that found markedly disproportionate 
treatment of minorities during police stops, significant prejudice among the police 
and majority populations about minorities and crime, nonexistent or inadequate citi-
zen-complaint mechanisms, and little or no measurement of the productivity of police 
stops. Second, in Russia, the Justice Initiative conducted observational research that 
documented profiling practices by police throughout the Moscow Metro system. The 
results show that the police are more than 20 times more likely to stop non-Slavs than 
Slavs—the most extreme racial profiling ever documented. The Justice Initiative is 
also preparing a report that will document for the first time the extent of ethnic profil-
ing during both ordinary police operations and counterterrorism activities throughout 
the European Union. Finally, the Justice Initiative is exploring further research in 
France, the Netherlands, and other countries.
Open Society Justice Initiative Resources 
on Ethnic Profiling 
“Ethnic Profiling and Counter-Terrorism: Trends, Dangers and Alternatives,” presen-
tation by James G. Goldston, executive director, Open Society Justice Initiative, before 
“Counter-Terrorism and Ethnic Profiling,” a seminar sponsored by the European Par-
liament Anti-Racism and Counter-Terrorism Intergroup, Brussels, Belgium (2006). 
www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2?res_id=103239. 
Ethnic Profiling in the Moscow Metro. Open Society Justice Initiative, New York (2006). 
www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2?res_id=103244. 
Justice Initiatives: Ethnic Profiling by Police in Europe. Open Society Justice Initiative, 
New York (2005). www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2?res_id=102731. 
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Summary of Findings
Across Europe, the problem of police discrimination is well known. Regional and 
national entities have documented frequent raids on Roma communities; dispropor-
tionate surveillance, identity checks, and searches in immigrant neighborhoods; and 
acts of police violence against members of ethnic minorities. More recently, human 
rights and monitoring organizations have begun paying attention to the specific prob-
lem of ethnic profiling, a particular kind of police discrimination that is less recog-
nized within Europe. Although organizations have documented many examples that 
suggest ethnic profiling by police may be widespread across Europe, the issue has not 
been subject to systematic research. 
Police officers engage in ethnic profiling when they use ethnic or racial stere-
otypes as a basis for suspicion in directing law enforcement activity. This practice is 
a particular concern in police-initiated stops—typically identity checks that may lead 
to a search. The use of ethnicity as a basis for law enforcement decision making is 
legitimate only when it is part of a suspect description stemming from a particular 
incident, or when specific time- and place-bound operational intelligence provides an 
objective and reasonable basis for directing suspicion. 
To date, only the United Kingdom systematically collects information on ethnic-
ity and police stop-and-search practices. The lack of statistical information from other 
European countries is a serious problem. Without hard information about the extent 
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of ethnic profiling and data on patterns of law enforcement practice, it is difficult—if 
not impossible—to develop strategies that address the impact of profiling on police 
relations with minority communities.
During 2005, in response to this problem, the Justice Initiative partnered with 
GEA 21 in Spain and with the Center for the Study of Democracy in Bulgaria and 
Professor András L. Pap and TÁRKI in Hungary to design and implement research 
that would begin to fill some of these knowledge gaps. The research examined the 
experiences of members of the Roma minority during encounters with the police 
in all three countries and the experiences of immigrants in Spain.1 In each country, 
the researchers conducted interviews with 60 or more police officers and led focus 
groups and interviews with members of minority groups. In Bulgaria and Hungary, 
these interviews included household surveys on people’s experiences and perceptions 
of police stops. In Bulgaria, the survey included a booster sample of Roma, which 
yielded statistically more conclusive findings. 
After initial background research on seven European states, researchers selected 
Bulgaria and Hungary because of their large Roma populations and Spain because, 
like many other Western European countries, it has both an indigenous Roma popu-
lation and a large population of (mostly non-Roma) immigrants. Other factors in the 
selection of the three countries included the willingness of police to participate in 
interviews and the capacity of local research partners.
Working with social science methodologies to detect patterns of police practice, 
the research focused on four fundamental questions:
 
 Do members of different ethnic groups have different experiences of being 
stopped by the police? 
 What can explain the different experiences members of different ethnic groups 
have with police stops? 
 Is there evidence of ethnic profiling?
 Are police stops used effectively to tackle crime? 
Despite the differing national contexts in which the research was conducted, 
the results indicate that the police in all three countries practice ethnic profiling. Due 
to methodological variations in the research, however, the results do not reveal the 
extent of the profiling. Roma pedestrians in Bulgaria and Hungary and immigrants in 
Spain have valid reason to believe that they will be stopped by police more frequently 
than majority nationals of these countries. They are also more likely to have unpleas-
ant experiences during vehicle and pedestrian stops, even when the population of 
individuals stopped by the police matches the ethnic or racial structure of the overall 
population. The study draws attention to the waste of police time and resources—
given that ethnic profiling is an inefficient method for reducing crime—and the lack 
of meaningful oversight or assessment of police procedures.
Ethnic Disparities in Police Stops
In both Bulgaria and Hungary, Roma are roughly three times more likely than non-
Roma to be stopped by police in pedestrian stops (see Figures 1 and 2). However, when 
both vehicle and pedestrian stops are considered together, there is no overall meas-
urable difference in the frequency of stops between Roma and non-Roma.2 In fact, 
in Bulgaria, there is evidence that the rate of vehicle stops is higher among majority 
ethnic Bulgarians than among minority Roma. This variance probably reflects higher 
rates of vehicle ownership among non-Roma in Bulgaria and Hungary (51 percent of 
ethnic Bulgarians own vehicles as compared with 20 percent of Roma and in Hungary 
58 percent of non-Roma own vehicles as compared with 35 percent of Roma). 
FIGURE 1
Bulgaria: Rates of police stops by ethnic background*
Note: * = Percentage of respondents to a 2005 household survey who indicated they were stopped by 
  police in the previous six months.
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FIGURE 2
Hungary: Rates of police stops by ethnic background*
Note: * = Percentage of respondents to a 2005 household survey who indicated they were stopped by 
  police in the previous year.
In addition to the disproportionate number of pedestrian stops of Roma, the 
research also found profound differences in the character of the stops. For both Roma 
and non-Roma people in Bulgaria and Hungary, reports of stops that did not result 
in negative experiences were more prevalent than reports of those that did, but Roma 
were more likely to report unpleasant experiences. For example, the survey indicated 
that in Bulgaria, 20 percent of Roma who were stopped experienced insults, one per-
cent experienced threats, and five percent experienced the use of force. For ethnic Bul-
garians, only three percent experienced insults, five percent experienced threats, and 
one percent experienced the use of force. In Hungary, the survey indicated that nine 
percent of all Roma were likely to experience what they perceived as a “disrespectful” 
stop, compared to three percent of the non-Roma population, although non-Roma 
individuals were stopped at similar rates. 
The qualitative data gathered in Spain reveal a clear perception among minori-
ties that they are targeted for police stops. These data suggest that Roma and immi-
grants often have negative experiences during police stops, and survey respondents 
recounted numerous examples of disrespectful and humiliating treatment.
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Reasons for Ethnic Disparities in Stop Experiences
In all three countries, the legal controls over police powers to stop people, ask for 
their identification, and conduct searches are relatively limited. Despite the fact that 
ethnic profiling contravenes international and European law, the Constitutional Court 
of Spain has expressly endorsed ethnic profiling as a tool of immigration control.3 In 
Bulgaria and Hungary, there are no clear legal prohibitions.
Interviews with police officers in Bulgaria and Hungary provide evidence that, 
while carrying out stops, some officers specifically target people who appear to be 
Roma. In Spain, some police officers reported that they target people who appear to 
be immigrants, especially when enforcing immigration laws. Roma in all three coun-
tries and immigrants in Spain report feeling targeted on the basis of ethnicity. Taken 
together, these findings are consistent with a pattern of ethnic profiling among at least 
some police officers. The evidence suggests this ethnic profiling is most systematic 
for immigrants in Spain.
The Effectiveness of Police Stops
The research methodology could not directly determine the effectiveness of police 
stops in the three countries. Evidence gathered in other countries suggests that, in 
order to tackle crime efficiently and effectively, police should target stops based on, 
among other factors, up-to-date intelligence on current crime patterns, observations 
of objectively suspicious behavior, and police-community dialogue.4 The accounts 
given by officers interviewed for this study provided little evidence of use of these 
strategies. In Bulgaria and Hungary, police stops—notably of vehicles—appear to 
be more frequent than in the United Kingdom or the United States. Additionally, in 
all three countries, although police officers target known offenders and sometimes 
make reference to geographical areas associated with higher crime rates, they do not 
otherwise appear to systematically analyze key suspects, crime hot spots, or linked 
crime events, as effective, intelligence-led policing requires. Finally, the research finds 
only limited evidence that the police and other officials in the three countries conduct 
routine internal monitoring and assessment of stops. 
Research in the United Kingdom and elsewhere has highlighted the negative 
consequences for minorities of disproportionate and negative encounters with police 
and the negative effects such encounters have on policing.5 When confidence and 
trust in police are diminished or lost, members of minority groups are less willing to 
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report crime or cooperate with police in investigations. A significant body of research 
indicates that when police treat people politely and provide a reason for the stop and 
when the stop is less intrusive (not followed by a search, for example), public satisfac-
tion with police procedures is much higher. Efforts by police managers to encourage 
their officers to treat people respectfully, including the sanction of problem officers, 
can result in more respectful treatment of the public by police.
Recommendations
On the basis of this research, the Justice Initiative has identified a range of possible 
improvements to police stop procedures and believes these improvements can benefit 
the police and all segments of the population. These improvements focus on reduc-
ing the number of unnecessary and unpleasant stops (in particular, identity checks 
and searches) of all segments of the population; reducing the targeting of members 
of minority and immigrant groups; improving the treatment of members of minor-
ity and immigrant groups during police encounters; making stop tactics more effec-
tive as a crime fighting tool; and strengthening public confidence—especially among 
minority and immigrant group members—in police and police tactics.
Recommendations to ministries of the interior and political authorities responsible for 
public security
 Speak out against ethnic discrimination, including ethnic profiling. Emphasize 
that profiling is not an effective tactic in the fight against crime.
 Set clear and precise written standards for initiating stops and making identity 
checks and searches. National law and police guidelines should set clear grounds 
for identity checks, stops, and searches, based upon a reasonable suspicion that 
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the subject has committed or is in the act of committing a crime. These stand-
ards should stress that ethnicity and other superficial personal characteristics 
do not provide a sound basis for stops and searches. Rather, these standards 
should emphasize those factors—such as objectively suspicious behavior and 
current intelligence about crime patterns—that enhance the effectiveness of 
police stops, identity checks, and searches.
 Build a robust public-complaint mechanism that includes specialized independ-
ent oversight or control. Bulgaria has recently created a human rights ombuds-
man office and a new antidiscrimination body. Neither focuses exclusively on 
the police, although the ombudsman can address cases of police abuse and 
the antidiscrimination body can consider individual cases of discriminatory 
policing. Spain and Hungary also have ombudsman offices that do not have 
oversight of policing. Civilian oversight can enhance the legitimacy of the com-
plaints process and improve policing by challenging problematic practices—
particularly by supporting the research and analysis of underlying patterns of 
complaints.6
Recommendations to police authorities
 Implement systems for monitoring stops according to ethnicity. Ideally, such 
systems should measure both the number of encounters and their character 
and quality relative to ethnicity. There are a number of ways in which police 
stops can be monitored: for example, radio calls can be tracked; police officers 
can record stop information with handheld electronic devices or paper forms. 
Under current laws in the three subject countries, the individuals stopped must 
give explicit permission for police to record ethnic data. Records of police stops 
should also include information on the reasons for the stops and information 
on the surrounding circumstances and the outcomes. The Justice Initiative 
suggests eliciting on-the-spot feedback from the people stopped, perhaps by 
having them note their level of satisfaction with treatment. Analysis of the data 
produced by these monitoring systems might include the following:
 — Compare the ethnic breakdowns of those stopped with benchmarks, such 
as area residential populations, to measure ethnic disparities.
 — Compare the ethnic breakdowns of stops undertaken by different police 
officers and teams of officers to identify problematic practices by indi-
viduals and contingents of the force.
 — Take random individual samples (dip samples) of stop records and require 
officers to account for stops that appear problematic.
 — Review the percentages of stops that produce arrests.
 — Assess the extent to which stops, checks, and searches correspond with 
current intelligence about local crime problems and priorities.
 — Introduce public satisfaction measures, overseen by members of minority 
ethnic groups, police teams, and individual officers.
 Closely supervise police officers carrying out stops, identity checks, and searches 
to ensure they adhere to established standards. Police supervisors should 
routinely review the reasons that officers give for carrying out stops, identity 
checks, and searches. Strategies for supervision should include authorization 
of the reasons for stops, direct physical oversight of patrol officers and their 
conduct during stops, and analysis of aggregate patterns of officer behavior 
during stops.
 Promote and enforce better treatment of all members of the public during 
police stops. A combination of clear standards, training, and supervision of 
officer conduct during police stops might improve public satisfaction with the 
quality of police encounters among all sections of the population. 
 Convene regular meetings with community members, particularly those rep-
resenting minority or disadvantaged sections of the population. Meetings 
between police and community members foster the officers’ accountability to 
the communities they are policing. Meetings also provide a means for gath-
ering valuable intelligence on crime problems, setting police priorities, and 
finding solutions to crime and other issues of concern to the community. This 
is not simply a “feel good” measure. Studies in various countries show unam-
biguously that regular community consultation contributes directly to reducing 
crime and improving the public’s sense of security.7
Recommendations to civil society
 Contribute to advancing knowledge and good practice by researching, monitor-
ing, and reporting on ethnic profiling practices and the policing of minority 
communities. 
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 Conduct education campaigns on rights and responsibilities in police-commu-
nity relations and support police-community dialogue whenever possible.
Recommendations to European regional authorities and agencies
 Make it clear that international and regional legal standards prohibit ethnic 
profiling. Incoporate this concept into the policies and programs of the prin-
cipal European regional organizations concerned with policing, security, and 
fundamental rights—the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe, and 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. (Recognizing the 
very limited remit of the EU in the realm of domestic policy, law enforcement 
agencies in this area should increase cooperation to address the dangers of 
profiling.) 
 
 Continue to study ethnic profiling practices. The European Commission against 
Racism and Intolerance, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xeno-
phobia, and other monitoring agencies should conduct new research to gen-
erate additional data on the extent and patterns of profiling practices in their 
respective areas of responsibility. 
 Fund programs for law enforcement cooperation and exchange. Ensure that 
these programs support more effective police practices and highlight the dam-
age and inefficiency caused by ethnic profiling. 
Introduction
The term “ethnic profiling” refers to the use by police of ethnic, racial, or religious 
stereotypes (rather than individual behavior, specific suspect descriptions, or accumu-
lated intelligence) as a basis for suspicion in directing law enforcement actions—in 
particular, discretionary decisions by officers to stop, question, and search pedestrians 
or vehicle drivers.8 This practice amounts to discrimination and is illegal according to 
international and regional standards and national laws in many countries.
Police stops, identity checks, and searches are manifestations of the investiga-
tive powers of the police to detect or prevent crime.9 The terms “stop” and “search” 
refer to a range of encounters that involve some element of police suspicion.10 For the 
purposes of the research described in this report, a stop is any police-initiated encoun-
ter in a public place. At the most basic level, a stop involves an individual’s being 
called to account by the police. In many cases it may also involve an officer’s request 
to see personal identification and a search of the person or the person’s vehicle. 
There are considerable differences among European nations in the legal powers 
of the police to conduct identity checks and stops. The legal standards in the three 
research countries allow the police to make stops and undertake searches with few 
restrictions or none at all. (See Appendix B for a description of the legal standards for 
police stops in each of the study countries.) A number of countries require that police 
articulate their minimum reasons for suspicion of an individual and their grounds 
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for undertaking a public stop and search. The definition of such minimum reasons 
and grounds varies in case law and police guidelines.11 
For the purposes of this report, the term “racial profiling” is synonymous with 
the term “ethnic profiling.” The term “racial profiling” was first coined in the United 
States to describe the use of racial or ethnic characteristics as clues for the police to 
decide who to stop, question, search, or otherwise investigate. The approach assumes 
these characteristics will help predict which people may be involved in law-breaking 
behavior.12 This approach is illegal according to international and European law. Avail-
able evidence suggests it is also an ineffective crime fighting strategy and may actually 
be counterproductive. Ethnic profiling is not simply an inconvenience for members 
of minority groups. It has far broader and more pervasive negative effects for indi-
viduals and communities. Profiling perpetuates negative stereotypes and stigmatizes 
entire groups as “suspect communities.” Furthermore, ethnic profiling misdirects 
law enforcement resources and threatens to alienate persons whose cooperation is 
necessary for effective crime detection and terrorism prevention. (See Appendix C for 
more on the ineffectiveness of ethnic profiling.)
Not all use of ethnicity is illegal or constitutes profiling. Police actions may 
include ethnic criteria as part of a description of a specific suspect in a particular 
crime or when police have specific, concrete intelligence regarding future crimes 
“involving a particular group of potential suspects at a specific location, for a short, 
specified duration of time.”13 A police stop based on specific information of this sort is 
termed a “low discretion” stop, but many police stops are high discretion stops—that 
is, based on the officer’s subjective judgment of suspicion rather than on specific 
information.
The Definition of Ethnic Profiling Used in this Research
Ethnic profiling describes the police use of ethnic or racial stereotypes as 
a basis for suspicion in directing law enforcement actions. Ethnic profiling 
occurs regardless of whether such stereotypes displace or are used in addi-
tion to legitimate factors directing police suspicion—such as individual 
behavior, suspect descriptions, or accumulated and specific operational 
intelligence. Ethnic profiling does not occur when these legitimate factors 
alone direct police attention to specific individuals from a particular ethnic 
group.
International and regional organizations, human rights organizations and 
NGOs have highlighted numerous examples of ethnic profiling,14 but in continental 
Europe this practice has been subject to little scientific research and analysis. This is 
a serious problem as, absent reliable information about the extent of ethnic profiling, 
it is difficult to develop strategies to address the impact of profiling on police rela-
tions with minority communities. Similarly, there is limited awareness of the issue of 
ethnic profiling and of the good practices that may help eliminate the problem where 
it exists. This report is an effort to fill some of these knowledge gaps. It presents the 
results from a new program of research on police stops, reviewing evidence of ethnic 
profiling among law enforcement agencies in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Spain. 
The research was carried out during 2005 by national organizations in each 
country, working in collaboration with the Open Society Justice Initiative.15 It sought 
to answer the following questions:
 Are there differences in the stop experiences of different ethnic groups within 
the study countries?
 What can explain differences in stop experiences among ethnic groups? 
 Is there evidence of ethnic profiling?
 Are police stops used effectively to tackle crime problems? 
Following meetings held in Budapest and Sofia of NGO and police experts from 
the United Kingdom, the United States, and a number of European countries,16 a 
methodology was developed for an in-depth assessment of ethnic profiling. The stud-
ies focused on police stops of members of Roma minorities in all three countries and 
police stops on the immigrant population in Spain. The research involved three main 
methodological strategies, although there were important variations among countries. 
The strategies included:
 extensive interviews with police officers about their activities and attitudes;
 focus groups and interviews with members of the public, including members 
of the majority and minority populations, about perceptions and experiences of 
policing; and
 national surveys in Bulgaria and Hungary, which included questions about 
experiences of and attitudes toward policing.17 
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In each country, the research benefited from the input of consultative commit-
tees comprised of academics, representatives of the police and government, minority 
and community groups, and other NGOs. The committee members drew on their 
experience in research, policing, and working with minority communities to help 
formulate the methodology, design questionnaires, and select research sites. They 
also analyzed and discussed the results and supported the formulation of the policy 
recommendations. Additionally, the research drew on an extensive review of national 
and comparative legal and academic literature. Table 1 summarizes the main meth-
odological strategies in the three countries. Appendix D also provides details of the 
survey methods used in Bulgaria and Hungary.
TABLE 1.
Summary of research methods used in each country
Country Public surveys Community interviews 
and focus groups
Police interviews
Bulgaria Nationally 
representative 
household survey 
sample of 1,202 
respondents plus 
a booster sample 
of 534 Roma 
respondents, all age 
15 or over.
3 focus groups, with Roma 
participants, in Sofia, Plovdiv, 
and the smaller town of Sliven.
55 interviews with officers 
from metropolitan areas 
(Sofia, Plovdiv, and Varna), 
regional districts (Sliven 
and Kyustendil), and small 
towns with a significant 
Roma population (Botevgrad, 
Kazanlak, and Levski).
Hungary Nationally 
representative 
household survey 
of 1,047 adults, 
including 
56 Roma.
6 focus groups in Budapest, 
Miskolc, and Pécs (3 with 
Roma and 3 with non-Roma).
20 interviews in Budapest, 
Miskolc, and Pécs with people 
(10 Roma and 10 non-Roma) 
who have experienced police 
stops.
80 interviews with officers 
who conduct police stops in 
Budapest, Miskolc, and Pécs.
Country Public surveys Community interviews 
and focus groups
Police interviews
Spain 10 focus groups in Madrid, 
Barcelona, and Malaga (2 with 
Moroccan immigrants, 3 with 
Roma, 2 with non-minority 
Spanish, 1 with Sub-Saharan 
African immigrants, 1 with 
Latin American immigrants, 
and 1 with a mixed group of 
immigrants).
12 interviews with people
who have experienced police 
stops in Barcelona, Madrid,
and Pamplona (2 Roma, 
4 Moroccan immigrants, 
1 Ecuadorian immigrant, 
1 Puerto Rican immigrant, 
2 Senegalese immigrants, 
1 Angolan immigrant, and 
2 non-minority Spanish).
61 police officers (18 national 
police, 19 civil guards, 
10 Catalan police, and 
14 municipal police) from 
Madrid, Fuelanbrada, Getafe, 
Malaga, and Prat de Llobregat 
in Catalunya.
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Ethnic Differences in the 
Experience of Being Stopped
In Bulgaria and Hungary, the research found no overall difference between the fre-
quency of police stops of Roma and non-Roma when considering both vehicle and 
pedestrian stops. A closer examination, however, reveals that this general finding 
obscures important differences. In both Bulgaria and Hungary, Roma are more often 
subject to pedestrian stops than non-Roma. In Bulgaria, there is evidence that the rate 
of vehicle stops is higher among non-Roma—a fact probably substantially influenced 
by higher rates of vehicle ownership among the non-Roma in Bulgaria and Hungary. 
Furthermore, in both Bulgaria and Hungary, Roma are more likely to have unpleasant 
experiences of stops and view police treatment as disrespectful. The Spanish research 
did not generate strong quantitative evidence about ethnic differences in stop rates, 
but there is a strong perception among both Roma and immigrant minorities in that 
country that they are targeted by police and and they frequently report having unpleas-
ant experiences when stopped. 
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Rates of Police Stops 
For this research project, Bulgarian and Hungarian partners collected data in pub-
lic surveys, a methodology that allows for a credible assessment of the existence of 
disparity.18 As the Spanish partner was not able to conduct a survey, assessment of 
evidence for disparity in Spain relies instead on the qualitative data, which provide 
only anecdotal evidence. This section reviews how similar stop rates among Roma and 
non-Roma in Bulgaria and Hungary are coupled with lower rates of vehicle stops of 
Roma in Bulgaria and higher rates of pedestrian stops in both Bulgaria and Hungary. 
It also examines qualitative evidence in Spain that highlights perceptions among the 
Roma and immigrant minorities that they are targeted for police stops.
Bulgaria
The data from Bulgaria on rates of stops are the most reliable collected in the three 
countries. It not only includes a large survey of the Bulgarian population, it also takes 
in a substantial “booster” sample of Roma, which allows for more reliable compari-
sons between Roma and non-Roma.
TABLE 2.
Frequency of stops among the Bulgarian population, by key ethnic groups***
Ethnic Bulgarian
percentage
Roma
 percentage
Other (e.g. Turkish)
 percentage
Significance of 
ethnic difference
All stops 18 18 19
Vehicle stops 14 5 19 **
Pedestrian stops 5 13 4 **
 Sample size 981 547 125
Notes:  * p < 0.05
   ** p < 0.01. Pedestrian stop totals are inferred from a combination of survey questions that 
suggest that respondents were not in vehicles at the time they were stopped.
   *** Percentage of respondents to a 2005 household survey who indicated they were stopped 
by police in the previous six months.
The data, presented in Table 2, do not offer a simple picture of disparity. In fact, 
the absolute rates of stops among three groups (ethnic Bulgarian, Roma, and other 
ethnic minorities) are strikingly similar: In each of these groups, approximately one 
in five individuals had been stopped in the previous six months.
The picture is more complex when different types of stops are examined sepa-
rately. Vehicle stops—the most frequent type of stop in the general population (14 
percent of the persons surveyed reported vehicle stops, while just 5 percent of the 
persons surveyed reported pedestrian stops)—are about three times more frequent 
among ethnic Bulgarians than Roma, and about four times more frequent among 
other ethnic groups than Roma. In other words, vehicle stops show a disparity that 
disfavors the majority Bulgarian population and other non-Roma ethnic groups. The 
next chapter of this report explores why this happens, but it is important to note that 
vehicle ownership is much higher among ethnic Bulgarians (51 percent) than Roma 
(20 percent), which has very clear implications for this pattern of stops.
Conversely, the pattern of pedestrian stops presents almost a mirror image. 
This type of stop is approximately three times more common among Roma than 
non-Roma.
Hungary
The Hungarian survey lacked the ethnic booster sample of the Bulgaria survey and 
relied on only 55 Roma respondents. This small sample size limited the survey’s abil-
ity to explore in detail the dimensions of ethnic difference in stop experiences. Even 
with this limited sample size, however, important conclusions can be drawn.
As shown in Table 3, Hungary has a lot in common with Bulgaria, and, over-
all, there is no clear evidence of disparity in stops. Vehicle stops are by far the most 
prevalent type of stop (18 percent of the survey respondents reported vehicle stops 
in the previous year, and just 3 percent reported pedestrian stops), but there are no 
statistically significant differences between the total number of stops (both vehicle and 
pedestrian) of Roma and non-Roma individuals. Car ownership rates in Hungary are 
substantially higher for non-Roma (58 percent) than for Roma (35 percent). Pedestrian 
stops do show important differences: They are approximately three times more com-
mon among Roma than non-Roma.
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TABLE 3.
Frequency of stops among the Hungarian population, by Roma and non-Roma***
Non-Roma
percentage
Roma
percentage
Significance of ethnic 
difference
All stops 24 29
Vehicle stops 18 13
Pedestrian stops 3 10 **
Other stops 3 6
Sample size (minimum) 986 55
Notes:  * p < 0.05
   ** p < 0.01. Subgroups of stops (vehicle or pedestrian stops, for example) relate only to the last 
recounted stop within the previous year, which results in a slight undercount.
   *** Percentage of respondents to a 2005 household survey who indicated they were stopped by 
police in the previous year.
Spain
Statistical data that would allow for comparisons between majority and minority 
stop rates were not available in Spain. Focus group data, however, provided personal 
accounts and perceptions of police stops for different ethnic groups. These data indi-
cate that minority groups perceive they are targeted for police stops.19 Similarly, people 
who had been stopped by the police and were interviewed reported that they were 
stopped frequently.
 “I get stopped about once a month, maybe a little less.” (Roma interviewee)
 “I get stopped almost every day in the center by police. Sometimes twice a day.” 
(Moroccan interviewee, undocumented youth)
The Character of Stops
In addition to establishing the disproportional rate of police stops, the research pro-
vides data on the actual character of the stops as experienced by members of the Roma 
and non-Roma populations. The survey data for Bulgaria and Hungary indicate that 
Roma are more likely to have what they perceive as unpleasant experiences during 
stops. In Spain, qualitative data suggest that when stops occur, Roma and immigrants 
experience them in a negative way.
Bulgaria
Table 4 presents data about survey participants’ reported experiences of police stops 
in Bulgaria and reveals that the Roma are consistently at a disadvantage. Specifically, 
the pattern suggests that Roma are more likely to be searched and more likely to be 
treated disrespectfully (including being insulted and threatened).
TABLE 4.
Characteristics of stops among ethnic Bulgarians and Roma 
(based only on those stopped in six month period)
Reported experience Ethnic Bulgarians
percentage
Roma
percentage
Significance of ethnic 
difference
Questioning 52 81 **
Search 8 21 **
Insults 3 20 **
Threats 5 14 **
Use of force 1 5
“Rights disregarded” 11 23 **
Taken to station 4 12 *
Arrested 1 7
No explanation given 35 43
Disrespectful treatment 26 41 *
Unprofessional treatment 26 31
Sample size (minimum) 122 84
Notes:  * p < 0.05
   ** p < 0.01
One Roma focus group respondent in Bulgaria gave a very vivid example of how 
his Roma identity was associated with bad treatment by the police.
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 “I was once stopped by the police for drugs: ‘Give us your ID and lift up your 
sleeves.’ I was like ‘Wait a minute, why don’t you go and catch a drug dealer? Why 
do you check me?’ I was almost about to cry. ‘Lift up your sleeves and don’t talk too 
much, you dirty Gypsy, [or] I’ll put you in the trunk [of the police car].’” (Roma 
interviewee)
Hungary
Although the survey information on stops in Hungary is less detailed than that for 
Bulgaria, a similar image emerges from the available data. Table 5 provides informa-
tion on the relative percentages of Roma and non-Roma interviewees who experienced 
what they felt to be disrespectful or unprofessional police stops. The data highlight 
how, overall, Roma were more likely to experience a disrespectful stop. Differences 
were most marked in pedestrian stops, which, in part, reflect that pedestrian stops 
are more common among Roma.
TABLE 5.
Experiences of perceived disrespectful and unprofessional stops among 
Hungarian Roma and non-Roma survey respondents 
(based on all survey respondents)
Non-Roma
percentage
Roma
percentage
Significance of ethnic 
difference
Disrespectful stop (any) 3 9 *
Unprofessional stop (any) 2 6
Disrespectful vehicle stop 2 2
Unprofessional vehicle stop 1 0
Disrespectful pedestrian stop 1 4 **
Unprofessional pedestrian stop 0 4 *
Disrespectful other stop 0 2
Unprofessional other stop 0 2
Sample size (minimum) 986 55
Notes:  * p < 0.05
   ** p < 0.01
These differences were echoed in the qualitative focus groups carried out as 
part of the Hungary research. Roma respondents indicated a much higher level of 
dissatisfaction with the police than non-Roma groups, although in part this was sim-
ply due to the greater prevalence of pedestrian stops experienced by Roma research 
participants.
Spain
Although there was no quantitative data in Spain, interviews with people who were 
stopped suggest that stops tend to be evaluated negatively by Roma and immi-
grants.
 “I often get body searched, and it is very humiliating. They sometimes take my pants 
down in the street.” (Moroccan interviewee)
The research involved just two interviews with non-minority Spanish, how-
ever—too few to establish whether their experiences of stops were fundamentally 
different from ethnic minority experiences.
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What Explains Ethnic Disparities 
in Police Stops?
A range of social, economic, demographic, and lifestyle characteristics may be associ-
ated with disproportionate police attention to ethnic groups. Some groups have more 
“risk factors” for police attention than others and will tend to be stopped more as a 
result, irrespective of whether police officers are engaging in ethnic profiling. A set of 
possible explanations for ethnic disparities in police stops includes the following:20
 Ethnic profiling by police. Membership in certain ethnic groups alone may be 
enough to create suspicion in the eyes of police.
 Other visible differences render some ethnic groups more suspicious when these dif-
ferences are stereotypically associated with gang membership or drug dealing, 
for example. Such associations may lead to ethnic profiling. 
 Geographical variations in police patrol. Police rarely spread their patrols evenly 
across space and time, and they are more likely to direct attention to (or per-
haps to avoid) problematic areas. This may involve police spending more (or 
less) time in neighborhoods that have higher concentrations of particular ethnic 
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groups. Although these variations ideally follow objective differences in crime 
patterns, ethnic profiling may contribute to the targeting of ethnic neighbor-
hoods. 
 Over-representation of certain ethnic groups in suspect descriptions. Such over-rep-
resentation may be linked to ethnic differences in crime rates, but it may also 
be linked to biases in the way people report suspects to the police.
 Demographic differences. Some ethnic groups will come under more suspicion 
because of demographics—for example, if they have a younger population pro-
portionally more prone to engage in criminal activity.
 Members of some ethnic groups spend less time at home. These groups may congre-
gate in public spaces where police stops are more likely to take place.
It is important to consider these risk factors for police stops as they can indicate 
the causes of disproportion among groups and whether such disproportion is reflec-
tive of ethnic profiling or some other factor. The final section of this chapter explores 
some of these explanations more systematically based on data from Bulgaria.
Possible Causes for Ethnic Disparity in Police Stops
• Ethnic profiling
 “When you see a Roma in the [name of area], you stop them.” (Bulgarian 
 police officer)
 “I consider the Roma suspicious. They get tied up in brawls, they band up 
 in groups in the evening and at night.” (Hungarian police officer)
 “During the day I can sometimes see a person who does not look Spanish 
 and could be stopped.” (Spanish police officer)
• Ethnic-specific suspect descriptions
 “I might get a call for a suspect that is a Moroccan man, dressed this way, 
 [of a certain] height and we stop people that look like him.” (Spanish police 
 officer)
• Intelligence on crime patterns
 “We understand urban tribes and we do stop and search Latin Kings [a gang 
 with roots in the United States] in discos because we get data on them. We 
 study statistical data and we anticipate.” (Spanish police officer)
• Geographical deployment
 The weekly and monthly periodic instructions of the Bulgarian police 
 patrol draws the attention of patrol officers to emerging risks in the areas
 under surveillance and give them an opportunity to respond by adjust-
 ing their activities. As a result, certain ethnic neighborhoods may be 
 targeted if the incidence of crime is geographically concentrated there. 
• Lifestyle differences
 In Bulgaria, vehicle stops are much more common among Bulgarians 
 (14 percent) than Roma (5 percent). At least in part, this reflects the fact 
 that vehicle ownership rates for Bulgarian (51 percent) are substantially 
 higher than for Roma (20 percent).
Police Suspicion and Ethnic Profiling
Although ethnic profiling violates a series of international standards, these standards 
are not clearly embedded in the national law of the three study countries. Some police 
officers in Bulgaria and Hungary engage in ethnic profiling by using Roma identity 
as a basis for stopping people. In Spain, some police report targeting certain groups 
of immigrants—also a form of ethnic profiling—while enforcing immigration laws. 
Certainly, many Roma community members in the three countries and immigrants 
in Spain believe that the police engage in ethnic profiling. 
International context
Elements of international and European law—including the UN’s Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights—establish that ethnic profiling is illegal. This principle is 
reinforced in the three countries by the European Convention on Human Rights and 
by the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance.21
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However, abstract legal norms do not always inform the policies and practices 
of individual police departments. Research suggests that, in the three study countries, 
there are few restrictions on the practice of stops and searches or on ethnic targeting. 
Antidiscrimination measures are not strong, and police officers are granted wide 
discretion in their use of stop tactics and associated searches.
Designing research to pinpoint and measure the precise extent of ethnic profil-
ing is challenging, typically requiring substantial resources and sophisticated meth-
ods. Although this research project was not so ambitious, it collected data that provide 
important evidence as to whether or not ethnic profiling exists in the three study 
countries. When, as part of this study, police officers provided their reasons for stops, 
some made it clear that ethnicity was at least some of the time the basis for targeting 
stops.
Bulgaria
By law, police officers in Bulgaria have the right to carry out identity checks for a wide 
range of reasons, without a high threshold of suspicion. They also have the right 
to carry out personal searches on the basis of grounds that appear, overall, to be 
fairly flexible. There is limited mention of the prohibition against discrimination 
in police directives, although discrimination is illegal according to national law (see 
Appendix B).
In interviews, patrol officers highlighted a number of factors they take into 
consideration when making stops. They said that stops are more likely to be carried 
out when someone
 fits the profile of crime suspects;
 is an outsider to the neighborhood, town, or village (often a Roma);
 has a “suspicious’ look (based on the officer’s instinct or feeling, but also some-
times on the individual’s behavior or appearance);
 is out late at night;
 carries a large bag or a package;
 is riding in a horse cart—a criterion particularly relevant to Roma (in some 
cases, stops of these carriages were routine);
 is obviously an intravenous drug user;
 could be an information source;
 appears to be Roma.
Another motivation for police stops is economic: asking for a bribe. According 
to the household survey, about 10 percent of those who reported vehicle stops indi-
cated that patrol officers demanded some sort of a bribe. Less than 1 percent of the 
pedestrian stops included demands for bribes.
A number of police officers emphasized Roma ethnicity as a reason for stops, 
primarily because the police perceive Roma as being heavily involved in crime.
 “You can’t really tell who [among the Roma] steals and who doesn’t. They almost all 
do.” (Bulgarian police officer) 
For these officers, Roma identity alone was a strong basis for stopping individu-
als. One officer suggested that he stopped all Roma, although in subsequent ques-
tioning he admitted he made a number of exceptions, such as not stopping Roma 
individuals that he knew personally. 
Many Roma believe that they are targeted by the police. In interviews in the 
region of Stara Zagora conducted by the Bulgarian NGO Links, Roma respondents 
stated that the police deliberately target Roma.22 
 “If somebody makes some mischief, the police immediately arrest a whole group of 
Roma for interrogation.” (Roma interviewee)
Many officers, however—particularly those working in Roma neighborhoods—
did not have a generalized suspicion of the entire ethnic group.
Police officers mentioned other variables linked to ethnicity that are markers for 
suspicion. Depending on the neighborhood, a member of an ethnic minority might 
be more likely to be viewed as an “outsider.” The ill-defined criterion of a “suspicious 
look” also increases the possibility that ethnic stereotypes may influence the police’s 
decisions. Lifestyle characteristics may also make certain ethnic groups more prone 
to suspicion. For example, targeting people riding a horse and cart naturally directs 
suspicion toward the Roma, who tend to travel this way, and away from other Bulgar-
ians, who do not—an approach that could constitute ethnic profiling.
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Hungary
Hungarian law gives police wide discretion in conducting stops and searches. Indeed, 
police have the authority to stop and ask for identification from “anyone whose iden-
tity needs to be established,” if it is “deemed necessary for the establishment of the 
identity, or if there is suspicion of a criminal or petty offense, or it is needed to prevent 
danger.”23 There is no reference to ethnic profiling in Hungarian law, although the 
constitution outlaws discrimination in policing. As in Bulgaria, some interviewees 
reported being stopped by police seeking bribes. 
When describing their reasons for searches, police officers highlighted three 
main factors, which are similar to those described by the Bulgarian police: 
 Has the person broken the law? 
 Does he or she look like someone on a wanted list? 
 Is he or she acting suspiciously? 
When discussing the basis for suspicion, Hungarian police described a number 
of factors, including:
 shifty appearance and behavior (with clothing and neatness important factors); 
 location and the time (perhaps the scene of a crime; someone whose presence 
is unusual at that place at that time of the day; “strange” behavior);
 the age and condition of the individual’s car; and
 appears to be Roma. 
About half of the police officers interviewed in Hungary said that some of their 
colleagues tend to stop members of certain ethnic groups more than others—and, 
most often, the Roma. In at least some cases, this tendency directly drove practice. 
 One has to pay more attention to the Gypsies. There is a greater chance that I catch 
someone off the wanted list. . . . I therefore assume that we should check them more 
closely, more frequently.” (Hungarian police officer)
The idea that Roma origin might be a basis for a stop was explicit and common 
in focus group data in Hungary.
 “Compared to a non-Roma, a Roma has a far greater chance of being stopped and 
searched by an officer, in any situation, for any reason.” (Roma interviewee)
Spain
In Spain, the legal limit of police powers—to stop persons for identification purposes 
and for searches—is not well defined. The law states that there must be a “motive” 
to require a person to identify himself or to carry out a search, but the definition 
of “motive” is vague. Regarding ethnic profiling, the situation is similarly unclear. 
Although discrimination is outlawed by the police law, ethnic profiling has been 
upheld by the Constitutional Court of Spain in the case of immigration control (see 
Appendix B).
The vast majority of police officers interviewed stressed the need for a justifi-
able motive for stopping, identifying, and searching someone. When asked to discuss 
specific reasons for carrying out stops, a number of factors were highlighted:
 direct observation of crimes and infractions (particularly in relation to vehicle 
stops)
 suspicious behavior, such as nervousness, avoidance of police attention, or 
carrying something
 physical appearance (for example, poor attire)
 time of day (for example, late night)
 resemblance to suspect descriptions
 record of prior criminal acts
 outsider status
 “sixth sense” feeling about a person’s intentions
 ethnicity
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 suspicion of undocumented immigrant status
 random preventative criteria
Officers rarely suggested that Roma identity was a direct reason for suspicion. 
Instead, they said Roma were stopped more frequently as a result of the legitimate 
policing of crimes in which Roma were more likely involved.
 “In [a certain neighborhood], police stop Gitanos [Roma] a lot more, but not due to 
their ethnicity but due to their way of acting. They do not work at all, they commit 
robberies, and engage in fights.” (Spanish police officer)
In some interviews, police described a more explicit connection between eth-
nicity and stops. In particular, the efforts to counter illegal immigration seemed to 
provide some police officers with what they considered a legitimate and legally sanc-
tioned basis for targeting anyone who appeared to be from an immigrant minority 
group. Although many police officers emphasized that apparent immigrant status was 
by itself not enough to justify stopping someone, appearance featured significantly in 
police accounts of reasons for stops.
 “We stop foreigners to see if they are illegal. How can we enforce the [immigration 
law] if we don’t stop people that look like foreigners?” (senior police officer, Spain)
 
The willingness to enforce immigration laws through ethnic profiling may not 
be surprising given that this principle has been upheld as legal practice by the Con-
stitutional Court of Spain (see Appendix B).24 Yet, some officers directly resisted the 
suggestion that they target stops on the basis of ethnicity.
 “I will not stop Muslims or anyone one else due to his ethnicity or nationality.” (Span-
ish police officer)
Members of minority groups—both immigrant and Roma—who took part in 
focus groups or whose opinions were articulated by NGO representatives, confirmed 
that ethnic profiling does occur, although some felt the practice was more widespread 
than others.
 “You are a suspect, by the hair, by the face, because you have a photocopy of your 
ID papers but not the [national residence number] . . . and that makes us nervous.” 
(Immigrant interviewee)
 “I believe that we were stopped just for being Gitanos [Roma]. They came directly at 
us. A Gitano who looks like the stereotype is stopped more.” (Roma interviewee)
A report from SOS Racismo, a Spanish NGO, cites specific incidents of police 
harassment and brutality targeted against Muslims. In some of these cases, police 
insulted victims by accusing them of involvement in the March 11, 2004, bombings 
in Madrid.25
Demographic and Lifestyle Factors 
As noted, factors other than ethnic profiling can contribute to ethnic disparities in 
police stops. Bulgaria is the one study country where the research produced suffi-
cient evidence to examine this issue in detail. The study shows that higher rates of 
vehicle stops among non-Roma in Bulgaria are fully explained by social and lifestyle 
differences—due to the higher rate of vehicle ownership among non-Roma and the 
underpolicing of Roma-only communities. It also shows that demographic and life-
style factors do not explain higher pedestrian stop rates among Roma in Bulgaria, 
reinforcing evidence that ethnic profiling accounts for this type of stop. Additionally, 
the research indicates that underpolicing of Roma-only communities actually acts to 
reduce the number of pedestrian stops experienced by Roma, superficially depressing 
reports of ethnic profiling. 
Differences between ethnic Bulgarian and Roma populations
To explore how social, demographic, and lifestyle factors might play a role in stop 
disparities, it is important to examine some key variables between ethnic Bulgarian 
and Roma populations in Bulgaria. Table 6 shows profound differences between the 
two groups. Overall, the Roma individuals are younger, much more likely to be unem-
ployed and less likely to have completed high school, and much less likely to own a 
car. There are also significant geographical differences between the two populations. 
The majority of both ethnic Bulgarians and Roma live in neighborhoods inhabited 
almost exclusively by their own ethnic group. Only one-quarter of ethnic Bulgarians 
and one-third of Roma live in neighborhoods that are ethnically mixed. 
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TABLE 6.
Demographic and lifestyle characteristics of Bulgarians and Roma
 Ethnic Bulgarian
percentage
Roma
percentage
Significance of 
ethnic difference
Under 35 32 42 **
Completed high school 79 11 **
Unemployed 7 43 **
Vehicle ownership 51 20 **
Goes out more than once a week 37 38 **
Bulgarian neighborhood 74 3 **
 Mixed neighborhood 26 35
 Roma neighborhood 0 62
Urban neighborhood 75 75
Vehicle stops 14 5 **
Pedestrian stops 5 13 **
Sample size (minimum) 986 579
Notes:  * p < 0.05
   ** p < 0.01
How ethnic differences affect disparities in stops
Statistical models provide a way of determining whether certain factors, such as those 
in Table 6, have a direct influence on (rather than just a correlation with) the prob-
ability that a person will be stopped by the police. Furthermore, they allow analysis of 
the relative significance of ethnicity as a predictor of stop rates after accounting for 
the statistical effects of other variables. If ethnicity remains a significant predictor, 
ethnic profiling is likely a factor.
Table 7 summarizes this analysis, focusing separately on vehicle stops and 
pedestrian stops (see Appendix D for more details).
TABLE 7. 
Summary of statistical models for predictors of stops (Bulgaria)
Vehicle stops Pedestrian stops
Age (older) – –
Female – –
High school completed +
Vehicle ownership +
Goes out every week +
Urban area +
Roma in ethnically mixed neighborhoods +
Roma in Roma-only neighborhoods –
Notes:  + increased likelihood of stops
   – reduced likelihood of stops
Vehicle stops: Taking a range of variables into account, Roma ethnicity does not 
increase the likelihood of vehicle stops. Instead, vehicle stops are more or less likely 
due to a combination of factors: age, gender, education (which may also be related to 
aspects of lifestyle), vehicle ownership, the person’s social activity during the week, 
and, finally, the character of the neighborhood. Notably, Roma people from exclusively 
Roma neighborhoods are actually less likely—other factors being equal—to experi-
ence vehicle stops. This fact may indicate the underpolicing of these neighborhoods. 
Table 8, considered in the context of the information in Table 7, supports two con-
clusions: that vehicle stops of non-Roma are more frequent because non-Roma are 
twice as likely to own vehicles and police are less likely to stop vehicles in Roma-only 
neighborhoods, perhaps due to underpolicing.
 Pedestrian stops: By contrast, the model for pedestrian stops shows that, after 
controlling for other variables, Roma ethnicity increases the chances of a stop. Spe-
cifically, Roma living in ethnically mixed neighborhoods alongside ethnic Bulgarians 
are more likely to be stopped, other factors being equal. Age, gender, and residence 
in an urban neighborhood are also important in predicting the likelihood of being 
stopped. The data on pedestrian stops add substantial weight to the existing evidence 
that Bulgaria’s police routinely practice ethnic profiling of Roma. Furthermore, it 
suggests that such profiling occurs specifically among police conducting pedestrian 
stops within ethnically mixed neighborhoods.
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The Effectiveness of Police Stops
To enhance public security, police stops must be used efficiently and wisely. The 
research methodology does not allow a direct measurement of the effectiveness of 
police stops. In the context of international research on effective policing, however, 
the accounts given to the Justice Initiative by police officers allow for some provisional 
judgments.
It is reasonable to assume that police stops will be most effective in tackling 
crime problems and reassuring the public when these stops are carried out in ways 
proven to be effective by research on police stops and on policing in general.26 Inter-
national evidence finds little support for the idea that ethnic profiling is an effective 
police tactic (see Appendix C).
The research suggests that police stops are most effective at detecting and reduc-
ing crime and reducing public fear of crime when stops meet these criteria: 
 based on strong grounds for suspicion, informed by current intelligence
 focused on current crime “hot spots”
 focused on more serious and active offenders 
 focused on crimes of concern to the public
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 based on definable suspicious behavior
 carried out in the context of community-police dialogue and cooperation
 carried out in a respectful manner, including a clear explanation of the reason 
for the stop
The research from Bulgaria, Hungary, and Spain does not indicate directly 
whether these criteria were met in the three countries. Two tests, however, provide 
strong indications of whether these guidelines are generally followed:
 Are stops guided by up-to-date operational intelligence (for example, focused 
on active offenders, local crime trends, and specific crime hotspots)?27
 Are stops subject to routine monitoring, evaluation, and feedback to ensure they 
are well targeted and meet effectiveness criteria? 
Measured against these criteria, the Justice Initiative’s research on stop prac-
tices in the three countries shows them to fall well below international standards of 
good practice.
General Observations about the Exercise 
of Discretion
Police officers in the three study countries said that, in targeting stops and searches, 
they had fairly wide discretion.
 “The law says I can stop and search whoever I want.” (Hungarian police officer)
One way to assess how this discretion is exercised in practice is to compare the 
surveys of Bulgaria and Hungary with recent surveys conducted in the United States 
and in England and Wales, as in Table 8.
TABLE 8. 
Rates of police stops in Bulgaria, Hungary, England and Wales, and the 
United States in 6 and 12 month periods28
Bulgaria (2005)
[last 6 months only]
Hungary
(2005)
England & Wales
(2002/2003)
United States
(2002)
Percentage of 
drivers stopped
[15] 18 10 8
Percentage of 
pedestrians stopped
[5] 3 3 5
Note:  Survey questions are not strictly comparable between countries, so some statistical differences 
may be explained by differences in methodology.
Table 8 shows that police stops of drivers in Bulgaria and Hungary are twice as 
common as in the United States and notably higher than in England and Wales. This 
suggests that discretion may be exercised more widely in Bulgaria and Hungary, and 
that stops—at least, of vehicles—are more a routine practice than a targeted effort. 
It is worth noting that, according to research conducted in the United Kingdom, in 
general, more frequent stops are associated with lower arrest rates.29
One explanation for the higher rates of stops in Bulgaria and Hungary is the 
broader remit of police responsibilities and the consequently greater attention police 
give to identity checks in these countries. In Bulgaria, for example, ensuring that all 
citizens are in possession of personal identity cards is one of the legally stated pur-
poses of police stops. In Spain, identity checks are also legally sanctioned and are an 
important factor in police stops, according to the research interviews (although the 
data do not show the overall rate of stops). This policing imperative is less relevant to 
the United States and the United Kingdom, where identity cards are not mandated.
 
Bulgaria
In Bulgaria, there is some evidence that police stops occur based on suspect informa-
tion and, to a lesser extent, location. Stop practices, however, do not seem to reflect 
a detailed analysis of information to identify the more serious offenders, current 
hot spots, or interrelated criminal events. For the most part, police officers did not 
indicate that information about crime problems (such as crime trends or high-crime 
locations) was relevant in the development of suspicion.
“ I  C A N  S T O P  A N D  S E A R C H  W H O E V E R  I  W A N T ”   5 3
5 4    T H E  E F F E C T I V E N E S S  O F  P O L I C E  S T O P S
Patrol officers are required to radio in details of all stops of persons and vehi-
cles; all registered offenses or disturbances of public order; and “official actions” taken 
in relation to stops, crimes, and offenses.30 Interviews with police officers indicated 
that, in practice, they radio in information only for stops that raise further suspicions 
or that involve a person whose identity cannot be established. Furthermore, neither 
the police officers interviewed nor their supervisors considered the “hit rate” of stops 
to be an indicator of efficiency. Analysis of ratios of arrests to stops was not used in 
any of the performance data summaries.31
Hungary
Most police officers interviewed in the Hungary research considered stop-and-search 
to be a justified and an effective procedure in criminal investigation (leading to the 
identification of wanted individuals) and, to a lesser extent, in crime prevention. 
 “Stop and search is the foundation of every procedure: without this, we cannot take 
the next step.” (Hungarian police officer)
Police officers in Hungary did not emphasize the relevance of up-to-date intel-
ligence in the development of suspicion. Rather, suspicion seemed to be based on 
generalities—an approach that can potentially lead to ethnic profiling.
The nature and purpose of monitoring and reviewing stop practices are not 
clear from the available data. On the positive side, significant attention is paid to 
police data collection and the reporting of stops. Police fill out paper forms at the 
stop location and later enter the data into a computer system at the police station. It is 
not clear, however, how the data are used to direct stop activity. Notably, only one-
quarter of the officers interviewed reported that their superiors oversee their stop 
practices. 
Spain
In interviews, Spanish police were also supportive of current stop practices. Officers 
felt that stops prevent crime, both by deterring and by intercepting wanted people. 
Officers even suggested that there is a perceived psychological benefit from stops 
among the population.
 “You get a sensation of security when you see seven or eight police on a corner and 
you do not have to worry about what is happening on your block.” (Spanish police 
officer)
Evidence that police stops might conform to effective principles was again lim-
ited. One officer mentioned intelligence-based targeting of police stops with reference 
to a criminal gang, but, in general, police stops did not seem to be primarily based 
on objective and systematic principles.“I might suspect someone but another police 
officer will not. It is very arbitrary,” one officer said. 
Additionally, among the diverse police forces studied, there is no systematic 
protocol for gathering data on the people who are stopped, identified, and searched, 
although there are some local initiatives in specific settings. This absence of protocol 
suggests that stops in general are subject to little ongoing assessment and evaluation 
for their appropriateness or effectiveness.
 “I never talk to other police about my criteria for stopping.” (Spanish police 
officer)
Public Support for Stops
Reliable information on public support for stops is not available for the three study 
countries, but some observations can be made from available data. 
Bulgaria
The research does not reveal what Bulgarians think about police stops. Recent public 
polls show, however, that most people in Bulgaria are concerned about their security 
and are in favor of strong police tactics against crime.32 
One way to examine the effect of stops on public opinion is to explore their 
direct relationship to determinants of public opinion, using multivariate statistical 
techniques. After controlling for other factors, statistical models indicate the factors 
associated with the public’s low confidence in police are
 direct experience of “disrespectful” treatment during a stop;
 residence in a Roma neighborhood; and
 ethnic Bulgarian or Roma origin (as s opposed to Armenian, Vlach, or another 
ethnicity). 
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Hungary
The research in Hungary shows a very high level of public support for stop tactics. 
In the national survey, 85 percent agreed (somewhat or strongly) that there should be 
more targeting of drivers, and 88 percent favored focusing on underground passage-
ways and train stations for frequent stops and searches. It also appears, however, that 
this support was for stops targeted at particular groups. Some 60 percent of respond-
ents agreed that persons who appeared to be Roma should be stopped and searched 
more than people who do not appear to be Roma; 57 percent agreed that persons who 
appeared to be Arab should be stopped more than those who do not; and 55 percent 
would support stopping and searching young persons more frequently. By contrast, 
45 percent of the respondents indicated that they supported more stops and searches 
among the general population if subgroups were not singled out for attention.
Even interviewees who had been stopped (about one-third of whom were Roma) 
were predominantly in favor of stop tactics, considered the practice to be right and 
justified, and would not want to change it.
Spain
The research in Spain did not collect data directly on the general public’s attitudes 
toward police stops, beyond noting the discomfort expressed by those who were 
stopped, notably members of the migrant communities. A national survey, however, 
recorded that between 67 and 80 percent of people (depending on the police agency) 
found police patrols helpful. This result suggests that the public is not negative about 
routine police activity but does not support further conclusions about their attitudes 
toward police stops. 
Conclusions 
The research found evidence of at least some ethnic profiling in each of the three 
countries studied, although the extent of it is unclear. These findings should help to 
advance thinking about ethnic disadvantage in police stops. First, they highlight how 
the experiences of stops can be worse for ethnic minorities, even when the rates of 
stops are not much different among groups. Second, in Bulgaria there is evidence that 
the underpolicing of Roma-only neighborhoods produces fewer stops in those neigh-
borhoods. Third, the findings raise questions about the value of aggregate stop rates 
as an indicator of ethnic profiling, because other factors have a substantial impact on 
disparities in stop rates. 
Experiences of Ethnic Minorities
 There is evidence of ethnic profiling in each of the three study countries, 
although not of its extent. This evidence is derived from interviews with police 
officers and Roma in the three countries and with immigrants in Spain. Police 
officers in Bulgaria and Hungary who described ethnic profiling referred to 
Roma, while officers in Spain who described ethnic profiling referred primarily 
to immigrants rather than Roma. Statistical data from Bulgaria indicate that 
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ethnic profiling is probably a feature of pedestrian stops rather than of the 
far more numerous vehicle stops, an idea supported by multivariate statistical 
analysis. Statistical data from Hungary, although less detailed and reliable, also 
suggest ethnic profiling may be a feature of pedestrian stops in particular.
 Immigrants in Spain are probably subject to the most systematic form of eth-
nic profiling identified by the research. Stopping people in part because they 
“look like foreigners” appeared, in some cases, to be accepted operational policy 
within the Spanish police force. This type of ethnic profiling, in relation to 
immigration enforcement, has been upheld as legal practice by the Constitu-
tional Court of Spain, even though it contradicts other police laws and European 
nondiscrimination standards.
 Roma in Bulgaria and Hungary are treated less respectfully during stops than 
members of majority populations. This finding must be set in the larger context 
in which—for both Roma and non-Roma ethnic groups in Bulgaria and Hun-
gary—the number of neutral experiences with police stops is greater than the 
number of negative experiences. Yet, the difference in the experiences of Roma 
and non-Roma is an issue of concern. In Spain, the data do not support direct 
comparisons of ethnic groups, but in interviews many Roma respondents and 
members of immigrant groups provided accounts of unpleasant stops. In the 
context of other findings, the results suggest that stop quality (how people are 
treated during a stop) may be as important as stop quantity (how often stops 
occur) in understanding ethnic disadvantage.
 
 In Bulgaria there is evidence of under-policing of Roma neighborhoods. (Simi-
lar data are not available for Hungary or Spain.) Other factors being equal, 
people living in Roma-only neighborhoods are much less likely to be stopped 
in vehicles, suggesting that police patrols in these neighborhoods may be less 
frequent or intensive. Although this pattern will tend to reduce the aggregate 
number of Roma targeted for police stops, it may also indicate a lower level of 
policing services provided to the Roma.
 Aggregate numbers of stops in Bulgaria and Hungary show no detectable ethnic 
differences. (Similar data are not available for Spain.) Ethnic profiling was more 
evident in the incidence of pedestrian stops in Bulgaria and, to a lesser extent, 
Hungary than in the more numerous vehicle stops. In Bulgaria, at least, traffic 
stops were even more frequent among the non-Roma population. The higher 
rate of car ownership in the majority population of Bulgaria seems to account 
for much of this vehicle-stop pattern in Bulgaria and may also be important in 
patterns documented in Hungary. Additionally, in Bulgaria, the low incidence 
of vehicle stops in Roma-only neighborhoods further explains a comparatively 
higher rate of vehicle stops among non-Roma. The findings add to existing 
doubts about the value of aggregate stop rates as a measure of ethnic profiling, 
given that social, demographic, and lifestyle differences among ethnic groups 
can also profoundly influence ethnic stop rates.33
Other Observations about stop tactics
 Routine stops place a burden on majority populations. Stops in Bulgaria and 
Hungary—specifically, traffic stops—are prevalent and much more common 
than in the United States or England and Wales. In part, this pattern may be 
driven by the regularity of identity checks, which are a routine part of opera-
tional policing in all three study countries. 
 Police stops do not closely adhere to international good practice for reducing 
crime. Although the research could not directly measure the effectiveness of 
stop tactics, there is no evidence that police in the three countries closely adhere 
to internationally recognized good practice. Specifically, there is little evidence 
that police stops are targeted according to up-to-date intelligence on current 
crime patterns—beyond basic use of suspect descriptions—or that they are sub-
ject to systematic internal review.
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Appendix A:
Country Characteristics and the 
Situation of Ethnic Minorities
In recent decades, all three of the study countries have made a transition from author-
itarian or totalitarian governments to democracies, although the timing and outcomes 
of these transitions have been very different. Today, their economic circumstances are 
profoundly different, with Spain the most affluent. Bulgaria faces the worst economic 
problems, dating back to its transition from communism.
Table 9 highlights key statistics from the United Nations and other sources that 
reveal some of the variations among the countries. 
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TABLE 9. 
Population characteristics of study countries
 Bulgaria Hungary Spain
Total population in millions (2003) 7.8 10.2 42.1
GDP per capita (2003) $7,731 $14,548 $22,391
Adult literacy rate (2003) 98.8 99.3 97.7
Life expectancy (2003) 72.2 72.7 79.5
Estimated Roma population 5 to 10 percent 6 percent 1.5 percent
Estimated foreign national population 1 percent 1 percent 9 percent
Sources: All figures except the Roma and immigrant population estimates come from United Nations 
Human Development Reports, http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/countries.cfm.Roma estimates 
are drawn from various sources, including: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
(Bulgaria), I. Kemény and B. Janky, 2003 (Hungary), and Fundación Secretarido Gitano (Spain). 
Immigrant statistics are drawn from: National Statistical Institute, Sofia34 (Bulgaria), Hungarian 
Statistical Office (Hungary) and Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración, Ministerio 
de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, and Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (Spain).
Bulgaria
The social cost of the democratic transition in Bulgaria, which began in 1990, has 
been one of the highest in Central and Eastern Europe. Gains for the population in 
terms of human rights and civil liberties are set against increases in unemployment, 
poverty, inequality, and economic insecurity,35 although, following an economic crisis 
in 1996–1997, there has been consistent economic growth and falling unemployment 
since 2000. Bulgaria became a member of the European Union (EU) in January 2007, 
although outstanding issues need to be addressed—including organized crime and 
corruption—through reforms in the judiciary and public administration systems.36 
Within the country, there are several ethnic minority groups. The largest are 
the Roma and the Turkish minorities, although there are also Armenians, Vlachs, 
Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, Jews, and Macedonians. The census from 2001 regis-
tered about 6,605,000 ethnic Bulgarians, 747,000 ethnic Turks, and 371,000 Roma. 
Roma leaders and experts estimate, however, that the number of Roma in Bulgaria is 
much higher than the census suggests.37 The UNDP estimates the Roma population 
to be between 600,000 and 750,000.38 The relative status of the two main minority 
groups in Bulgaria is very different; the Turkish minority fares much better than the 
Roma on most indicators.
Hungary
Hungary is considered a stable liberal democracy with a functioning market economy 
and, in contrast with Bulgaria, represents one of the most successful post-transition 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. During the transition period, the country 
recorded strong growth and, by 2002, was attracting more than one-third of all for-
eign direct investment coming into Central and Eastern Europe (including Russia).39 
Hungary’s successful transition culminated in its membership in the EU in 2004.
Within Hungary there are thirteen recognized national and ethnic minorities 
including Roma, German, Slovak, Croat, Serb, and Romanian. The number of immi-
grants and foreigners with non-European origins has been increasing in recent years, 
although the number is still relatively small and includes mainly transitory people and 
those from neighboring countries. About 80,000 to 100,000 immigrants arrive each 
year, but as Hungary is mainly a transit country of international migration, most of 
them depart to Western Europe within a few days or weeks.40 The Roma are the larg-
est minority in Hungary. The most definitive research, conducted in 2003, indicates 
a Roma population of between 570,000 and 600,000.41 
Spain
Spain made its transition from dictatorship to democracy after 1975 and became a 
member of the European Community (now the European Union) in 1986. Since then, 
the country has made substantial economic progress, and recent improvements in 
living standards are starting to make up for its years of underdevelopment relative to 
other parts of Europe.42 
Spain has an estimated Roma population of between 600,000 and 800,000, 
representing about 1.5 percent of the total population.43 Other ethnic or racial minori-
ties in Spain include recently arrived foreign immigrants, with non-Europeans only 
recently highly visible within the country. In December 2005, there were approxi-
mately 2.7 million foreign migrants with residency papers in Spain, of which about 
825,000 are from Latin America, 570,000 from EU countries, and 600,000 from 
Africa (mostly Morocco).44 These figures do not include the estimated 800,000 to 
1 million undocumented migrants and those immigrants who have received Spanish 
citizenship, totaling about 210,000 in 2003.45, 46
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The Situation of the Roma
All three study countries have a significant population of Roma. This section describes 
how this group represents the most disadvantaged and discriminated-against minor-
ity group in all three countries, and probably in Europe generally.
Bulgaria
In Bulgaria, Roma face enormous social and economic disadvantages. Most Roma live 
in urban areas (about 54 percent, based on the 2001 census), either in the capital city 
of Sofia or in regional centers. Often these settlements are walled, and the majority 
of the dwellers rarely venture outside. More than 90 percent of Bulgaria’s Roma say 
they have sometimes or often experienced food-deprivation;47 65 percent of the Roma, 
ages 16 to 60, are unemployed.48 One in every five Roma has been unemployed for 
more than 10 years, and one in two has been unemployed more than five years.49 The 
Roma illiteracy rate is 15 times higher than that of the non-Roma population.50
This disadvantage is closely linked with discrimination against Roma. Indeed, 
public polls reveal an increasing intolerance toward Roma among both Bulgarians 
and Turks. For example, 86 percent of Bulgarians consider the Roma irresponsible 
and lazy, and 92 percent judge them as inclined toward criminal acts.51 The European 
Roma Rights Centre, among other organizations, has raised a range of concerns about 
discrimination, including evidence that Roma are the targets of racially motivated 
violence, abuse at the hands of police, and systematic racial discrimination in areas 
such as education, housing, medical care, and employment.52 Police abuse in Bulgaria 
appears to be frequent and is relatively well documented.53 As recently as 2004, the 
European Court of Human Rights found the police liable for abuse of Roma.54 
Roma are substantially overrepresented in Bulgaria’s criminal justice system.55 
This fact could indicate either higher rates of criminality (which would not be sur-
prising in the context of the group’s economic marginalization) or discrimination 
by police and the criminal justice system—or a combination of both. Unpublished 
statistics from Bulgaria’s Ministry of the Interior suggest that disproportionate Roma 
involvement in police-suspect statistics may have decreased relative to peaks in the 
1990s, but Roma are still overrepresented by a factor of between 2.7 and 4.7.56 Hom-
icide data, usually considered the most reliable of police data as an indication of 
underlying crime (although not necessarily of suspect characteristics), suggest over-
involvement of Roma in murder by a factor of at least two. In a 2002 study of 12 Bul-
garian prisons, self-identified Roma constituted between 38 percent and 40 percent of 
all prisoners in 10 facilities. According to prison staff and officials from the judiciary 
branch, the figure could be as high as 80 percent, given that many Roma choose not 
to identify themselves as Roma.57
Hungary
Roma in Hungary are also economically disadvantaged, with unemployment rates at 
around 50 to 55 percent and dependency upon social assistance at 22 percent. Few 
Roma have acquired a secondary or higher level of education.58 More than half of the 
Roma households in Hungary do not have access to hot running water, and 35 percent 
do not have access to cold running water. More than half of the houses do not have 
indoor toilets, and 13 percent have one or more members of the household sleeping 
on earthen floors.59
In some respects, however, the Roma may be less disadvantaged in Hungary 
than some other European countries. Hostile public attitudes toward the Roma appear 
to have decreased since the late 1990s.60 Similarly, compared to Bulgaria, the gener-
ally higher economic living standards in Hungary place the Roma there in a better 
situation.61 
Yet public opinion and media representation of the Roma reinforce stereotypes 
that associate the Roma with criminality.62 This association is likely linked to the sub-
stantial overrepresentation of Roma within the criminal justice system of Hungary. 
Research from the 1990s suggests that at least 40 percent of prison inmates are 
Roma.63 At least part of this overrepresentation may be explained by the poor treat-
ment of Roma within the justice system, with a number of reports highlighting prob-
lems of discrimination, ill treatment, limited legal representation, and high rates of 
pretrial detention.64 Overrepresentation in criminal activity is not surprising, however, 
given the significant economic marginalization of Roma in Hungary.
Spain
Considering Spain’s higher level of economic development, levels of poverty and 
social exclusion among Roma communities there are less than they are in Central and 
Eastern Europe, although Spanish Roma face many of the same kinds of problems.65 
Few Roma hold salaried jobs, for example, and most are engaged in independent, 
part-time, or informal labor. Government statistics suggest that most jobs held by 
Roma are low paid and are primarily in the informal sector, with 50 percent to 80 per-
cent working in “traditional professions” of peddling, collecting solid waste, and per-
forming seasonal work.66 NGOs highlight the continuing problem of discrimination 
in employment, housing, education, and other services.67 The Spanish government 
has developed explicit policies to improve the circumstances of the Roma, including 
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the National Program for the Development of the Roma, which combines the efforts 
of national and local governments and NGOs.
As in other countries, Roma communities are subject to stereotyping. The stere-
otype of Roma as criminals has a long history, and there are many examples of this 
stereotype’s perpetuation by politicians, opinion makers, and the media.68 Although 
there is limited data on the subject, the Roma appear to be substantially overrepre-
sented in the criminal justice system. For example, a 1999 study of female prisoners 
showed that 25 percent of Spanish women prisoners were Roma—more than 10 times 
their representation in the country’s population.69 The same study concluded that 
discrimination was likely to be an important reason for this overrepresentation. 
Discrimination toward the Roma by the Spanish criminal justice system has 
strong historical roots. It was only in 1978 that three articles in Civil Guard Regula-
tions, calling for specific police surveillance of Roma people, were repealed. In the 
contemporary context, there are still examples of policing practices that are aggres-
sively directed at Roma, including heavy-handed raids of Roma neighborhoods.70 
Immigrants in Spain
As noted, immigrants from a diverse range of national and ethnic origins represent a 
substantial part of Spain’s population. Their growing presence has also led to the rise 
of many popular fears and misconceptions in Spain, such as the association between 
immigration and increased crime rates. A recent study found that the percentage of 
people who describe themselves as anti-immigrant has grown from 8 percent to 32 
percent in the past eight years. About 60 percent of the population relates crime to 
immigration.71
Immigrants in Spain fare less well in socioeconomic terms than Spanish citi-
zens. For example, Spanish government data on Ecuadorians, Colombians, and Moroc-
cans show that immigrant workers from these groups are substantially less likely to 
hold permanent contracts than Spanish workers.72 Immigrant workers are also seg-
regated by economic sector, with men concentrated in construction and agriculture 
and women in service industries, particularly domestic service, the hotel industry, and 
retail trade.73 Although 9 percent of Spanish people live in houses with six or more 
people, the same is true for 40 percent of African immigrants, 38 percent of Latin 
American immigrants, and 29 percent of Eastern European immigrants.74 
Like the Roma, Spain’s immigrants are also overrepresented in the criminal 
justice system. Although immigrants constitute only 9 percent of the national popu-
lation, they make up 31 percent of those arrested.75 Again, there is evidence that this 
group of minorities may be subject to discrimination within the system. For example, 
foreign prisoners are substantially less likely to be paroled than Spanish prisoners.76
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Appendix B:
The Police and Their Powers
There are important distinctions in the way the police forces are structured in the 
three study countries. One key difference is the degree of centralization in the three 
systems. Bulgaria and Hungary have highly centralized police agencies, whereas 
Spain includes tiers of regional and municipal police agencies. 
Bulgaria
Except for the military police, all Bulgarian police services are part of the Ministry 
of the Interior, with the Law for the Ministry of the Interior regulating their func-
tions, powers, and duties.77 The police agencies include the National Police Service, 
the National Service for Combating Organized Crime, the Border Police Service, the 
National Fire Safety and Protection of Population Service, and the National Gendar-
merie. Of these, the National Police Service is the major policing organization dealing 
with crime detection, crime prevention, and the protection of public order, including 
control of highway traffic. The Security Police forms the key part of the National Police 
Service and is responsible for public order, the protection of individuals’ rights, and 
the preservation of property rights. This uniformed body is in charge of the police 
patrol, but it also supports other departments of the National Police Service that are 
in charge of crime detection and investigation. 
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In Bulgaria, two main agencies can carry out police stops: the Security Police 
and the National Gendarmerie. Most stops are carried out by the Patrolling and 
Guarding Activity units of the Security Police. The Security Police is always the larg-
est unit within an Area Police Department (APD). It is headed by a senior officer and 
supervisor, who reports to the head of the APD. Other Ministry of Interior agencies 
can conduct stops, but only under specific conditions. 
Hungary
The national chief commissioner of police in Hungary is directly subordinate to the 
Minister of the Interior. Local police branches operate independently of the local gov-
ernments and are, therefore, not accountable at that level. The centralized state police 
force operates under a strictly hierarchical system that runs parallel to the military 
hierarchy. At the top of the hierarchy is the National Police, whose head is the chief 
police commissioner, who carries the rank of police general. There are 19 county 
police organizations in addition to the Budapest police headquarters, each of which is 
directed by a police commissioner. Provincial police stations function as subordinates 
to the regional police headquarters. Each of these provincial stations is directed by a 
police superintendent. 
The public prosecutors’ offices are responsible for safeguarding the lawfulness 
of criminal investigations. They have the power to revise measures taken by police 
authorities during the course of their investigations, to assess and oversee the lawful-
ness of arrests, to hear complaints against decisions taken during the investigation, 
and to represent the case in court.78 
Spain
Spain’s police agencies are more layered than those of Bulgaria and Hungary, com-
bining national and regional police agencies with municipal police forces. The two 
national police forces are the Civil Guard (which is responsible for rural areas, national 
traffic, and border control) and the National Police Corps (which is responsible for 
urban areas and control of foreigners). These centralized agencies include more than 
two-thirds of the police officers in Spain. There are also three autonomous regional 
police forces that have assumed much of the role of the national forces in Catalunya, 
the Basque Country, and Navarra.79 
These large force structures overlay a highly localized patchwork of about 1,700 
police forces run by municipal governments. These police forces have the power to 
undertake patrols, make stops, carry out searches, and make arrests. 
Legal Regulation of Police Stops and Discrimination
Elements of international and European law suggest that ethnic profiling is illegal.80 
On an international level, the UN’s International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination prohibits racial discrimination with respect to 
“freedom of movement” and the “right to equal treatment before the tribunals and 
all other organs administering justice.”81 The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights prohibits racial discrimination in relation to “the right to liberty and 
security of the person,” outlaws “arbitrary arrest or detention,” and bars deprivation 
of liberty “except...in accordance with procedure[s]...established by law.”82
At the regional level, the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits 
racial discrimination in the enjoyment of civil and political rights, including the rights 
to liberty and security of the person, and also the determination of civil rights and 
any criminal charge.83 In recent years, the European Court of Human Rights in Stras-
bourg, France, has increasingly applied these provisions to policing.84 The European 
Commission against Racism and Intolerance, a body of the Council of Europe, has 
also specifically addressed ethnic profiling in stops and identity checks, even within 
the context of the war on terror.
Bulgaria
Under Bulgaria’s law, all police officers and police aides have the right to carry out 
identity checks for a wide range of reasons that do not necessarily require a high 
threshold of suspicion.85 Grounds include: suspicion that the person has committed 
a crime or an offense, detection or investigation of a crime, examination of ID docu-
ments or residence permit, standard procedure at police checkpoint, and the request 
by another state body for assistance. All police officers can stop vehicles to check 
IDs or driving licenses. A police officer may detain individuals whenever there is 
evidence indicating they have committed a crime, they have refused to follow lawful 
police orders, they are fugitives from lawful detention, or their identity cannot be 
established.86 
Police officers and police aides also have the right to conduct personal searches 
on grounds that appear, overall, to be fairly flexible.87 Searches can take place 
whenever police have information indicating that suspects are carrying prohibited 
objects or have been found in a place where a crime or a violation of the public 
peace has occurred. Inspection of personal belongings is also permitted in all cases 
in which the police check personal identity and have enough information or material 
evidence that a crime is being concealed. Police officers and police aides also have 
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the right to carry out inspections of vehicles when informed of a violation of 
the public peace.
Currently, the only provisions prohibiting discrimination in police work are 
elaborated in the Law on the Ministry of the Interior (LMOI), Instruction I-23, which 
requires officers to “respect the dignity and rights of all citizens, without discriminat-
ing according to age, gender, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, political views and 
nationality.” Neither the LMOI nor its Implementation Regulation, however, contains 
provisions to restrict discrimination. Although the practice of ethnic profiling may 
comply with all police provisions, it nonetheless remains a violation of the Constitu-
tion and the Law on Protection against Discrimination. 
Hungary
Hungarian law also gives the police wide discretion to make stops and conduct 
searches. Article 29 of the 1994 Act on the Police gives police full authority to stop 
and ask for the identification of “anyone whose identity needs to be established.”88 No 
suspicion is required for this procedure, and failure of a person to identify himself 
or cooperate can lead to search, arrest, and up to 24 hours of detention without prob-
able cause. A search may be conducted if an arrest is taking place or if it is “deemed 
necessary” for the establishment of a person’s identity; if there is suspicion that a 
person has committed a criminal or petty offense; if it is necessary to prevent “dan-
ger”; or during raids. In effect, Hungarian law allows searches of practically anyone 
at practically any time. Furthermore, the police are under no obligation to provide an 
explanation for a search unless it is specifically requested.89 Further, Article 44 of the 
Act on the Police allows the police to stop vehicles at any time to check the legality of 
vehicle operation and possession.
Although the Act on the Police does not refer to discrimination, Hungary’s legal 
system does. For example, the Hungarian constitution has a general antidiscrimina-
tion clause that refers to fundamental human and civil rights,90 and a decision of the 
constitutional court extended the principle of nondiscrimination to the entire legal 
system.91 Hungary also passed an antidiscrimination code, which came into force on 
January 27, 2004.92 As the laws are currently understood, however, ethnic profiling 
does not amount to discrimination, but police leadership has made an official com-
mitment to scrutinize all reports of anti-Roma discrimination within the force. The 
chief of the national police receives an annual report on these cases.
Almost all of the police officers who participated in the Justice Initiative study 
said during interviews that they were familiar with the Act on the Police and with the 
Service Regulations of the Police, both of which regulate police stops. Almost all had 
also received training on the process of conducting stops. There was some variance 
in views among officers as to whether the regulations allowed them to stop anybody 
they wanted or whether the regulations allowed them only to make stops in cases 
where there was at least some cause. Officers seemed to understand that their legal 
discretion was wide.
Spain
In Spain, the legal limits of police powers to stop persons for identification and for 
searches are not very specific. All police can stop and identify persons; however, the 
law states that there must be a “motive” to conduct a search or to require a person to 
identify himself. Exactly what constitutes a “motive” is undefined. The Constitutional 
Court has ruled that the police have the right to search a person, even if there is no 
previous indication that the person has committed a crime, as long as the police 
action is carried out “within the framework of prevention and investigation of crimi-
nal activity.”93 Spain’s Supreme Court has ruled that the procedures for establishing 
the identity of a person or undertaking a search must be carried out with reasonable 
care and with a reasonable spirit of investigation; the police can act upon simple 
suspicion, but the suspicion cannot be “illogical, irrational, or arbitrary.”94 Stops and 
searches of drunk drivers, however, do not have to have a motive.
Regarding racial profiling, the Law on the Security Forces and Corps states 
that police officers must act in all situations with “absolute political neutrality and 
impartiality, and...without discrimination based on race, religion or opinion.”95 A Con-
stitutional Court decision, however, supports racial profiling—at least, in immigration 
control. The court upheld the legality of a decision by the national police to stop an 
African American woman with Spanish citizenship solely on the grounds of race. 
The vast majority of the police interviewed for the Justice Initiative’s study 
stressed that they must have a justifiable motive for stopping, identifying, and search-
ing a person, and that this motive cannot be random or arbitrary. 
Police Culture and Integrity
The data available on the culture and integrity of the police forces in the three study 
countries are not consistent or strictly comparable. Available data indicate that police 
agencies in all three countries have been accused of committing human rights viola-
tions, although there are also some efforts within the countries’ police agencies to 
address such problems. 
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Bulgaria
The Bulgarian police service is a relatively closed organization. Despite attempts at 
reform, its basic structure continues to reflect the Soviet model of a centralized and 
militarized institution.96 Since the early 1990s, the spirit of police centralization may 
have been buttressed by the recruitment of a large number of former military con-
scripts and officers.97 Civil control and public transparency have therefore not yet 
taken a firm hold, and issues of integrity have plagued the Bulgarian police. For 
example, a survey of the Bulgarian public found police officers at the top of the list 
of public officials who have asked for bribes in 2005: 28 percent of respondents who 
had interactions with the police were asked for one.98
Repeated international criticism, along with judgments by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), have led the police to introduce reforms aimed at 
improving treatment of minorities. Despite there being fewer abuses reported now 
than during the 1990s, a judgment relating to police abuse of Roma was handed 
down as recently as 2004.99 The Bulgarian police have begun to organize training 
programs on human rights and minority issues for their personnel. A specialized 
human rights committee was set up in the National Police Service in August 2000, 
and a coordinator has been appointed for each regional police directorate to relay the 
committee’s work by organizing human rights training for police officers at the local 
level. Additionally, during the past 10 years, the Ministry of the Interior has been 
working with NGOs and foreign police services on a number of joint projects aimed 
at bringing the Bulgarian police in line with international professional standards 
and practices. 
For example, in collaboration with the Open Society Institute–Sofia, the 
Minister of the Interior approved two community-policing projects in Roma neigh-
borhoods in 2002, and there are plans to extend elements of these projects to other 
areas that have substantial Roma populations. Despite these developments, the Justice 
Initiative interviews revealed the presence of negative attitudes toward the Roma, 
with respondents referring to the Roma as “lazy” and “irresponsible.” The same inter-
views showed that police officers did not seem to be able to discuss human rights 
concepts and principles and did not seem to remember much of the content of 
courses they attended. 
Until recently, Bulgaria had no independent body to investigate complaints of 
ill treatment or discrimination made against members of the police force. Allega-
tions have instead been investigated by officers from other police stations or by the 
prosecutor’s office. In 2003, however, a new law established the Commission for 
Protection against Discrimination, an independent, specialized state body to prevent 
discrimination and ensure equal opportunities. This agency has the power to inves-
tigate complaints relating specifically to discrimination made against the police and 
other governmental bodies.100 
Hungary
According to Justice Initiative interviews with police officers, all officers have some 
kind of professional training, although the majority receives instruction from police 
training schools rather than degrees from police colleges. The same interviews 
revealed a level of disillusionment with the job, with most police officers bothered 
by the low social prestige of police work. Many officers also complained about low 
salaries. There are no statistics on the ethnic makeup of the police force, although 
some Roma recruiting programs have been launched in recent years.
There are no explicit standards in Hungary for the policing of minority com-
munities, but the police leadership has made an official commitment to scrutinize 
all reports of anti-Roma attitudes and behavior. Police training also covers issues of 
racism and human rights, and there are initiatives to recruit Roma into the police 
force.101 Evidence suggests, however, that anti-Roma attitudes are strong. Since 1994, 
ill treatment of Roma at the hands of the Hungarian police has been widely docu-
mented by human rights NGOs, including the Legal Defense Bureau for National and 
Ethnic Minorities, the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, and the Romani Civil Rights 
Foundation. In 2004, the Hungarian human rights movement enjoyed its first victory 
in defense of Roma rights before the ECtHR when the court acknowledged inhuman 
and degrading treatment by the police against a Roma victim.102 A 1997 survey by the 
Ministry of the Interior showed that 54 percent of police perceived criminality as a 
central element of Roma identity, and similar views are echoed in police interviews 
carried out during this study.103 As in Bulgaria, there is no independent mechanism 
in Hungary for investigating allegations of police abuse. Instead, the police or public 
prosecutor’s office conducts investigations. 
Spain
The diversity of police agencies in Spain makes it difficult to characterize the coun-
try’s police in general terms. The municipal police are particularly varied. Some 
have progressive chiefs, extensive community contact, and significant accountabil-
ity, while others have more reactionary chiefs with less transparent organizations.104 
NGOs and human rights organizations have published reports on certain aspects of 
police activity in relation to minority groups, racism, and discrimination. Amnesty 
International, the UN Committee against Torture, the European Commission against 
Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), Spain’s Movement against Intolerance, SOS Rac-
ismo, and Statewatch have all produced documents and periodic reports on racist 
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incidents—directed toward both Roma individuals and immigrants—including police 
harassment, violence, and brutality.105 
There is a notable absence of training regarding minority relations in all 
police academies except the Catalan Police Academy. Human rights training forms a 
part of the training program for all of Spain’s police agencies, however. Such 
training is conducted with the participation of members of minority groups and 
NGOs such as Amnesty International, UNESCO, and Fundación Secretariado 
General Gitano. A study by Amnesty International carried out at the request of 
the Ministry of the Interior, however, concluded that police training in human rights 
is insufficient.106 Spain also lacks an independent body to investigate allegations 
of police abuse, relying instead on internal investigations and investigations by 
prosecutors. The ECRI notes that, when complaints are filed, investigations are cur-
sory and lack transparency. Even more disturbingly, countercharges are frequently 
brought or threatened against those persons who intend to lodge a complaint of police 
misconduct, and these countercharges, unlike the complaints filed, tend to be 
successful and swiftly resolved.107
Public Attitudes toward Police
The data and relevant literature support several conclusions about the public percep-
tions of policing. Notably, in Bulgaria and Hungary, the public sees the police as cor-
rupt and incompetent, although this view is coupled with strong support for tough 
police tactics. In Spain, evidence suggests that popular perceptions of the police are 
more positive. By contrast, Roma in all three countries and immigrants in Spain are 
often fearful of the police, a feeling rooted in direct experiences of unpleasant police 
encounters.
Bulgaria
Public polls show that most Bulgarians are concerned about their security and favor 
strong police tactics against crime.108 In general, however, their trust in the police is 
not particularly high, with half of the survey respondents in the current research 
expressing “little” or “no” trust in the police (there was even less confidence in some 
other public institutions). No doubt this relates, at least in part, to the perception of 
a strong association between police and corruption.109
A 2000 survey of ethnic minorities, although not strictly representative, pro-
vides some insight into minorities’ perceptions of the police.110 Ethnic Turks had the 
highest respect for the police and indicated that they found police officers to be profes-
sional and well-mannered toward citizens. Despite this generally positive evaluation, 
they indicated that the police were authoritative, corrupt, and had a tendency to com-
mit professional violations. Roma interviewees, on the other hand, considered police 
officers to be corrupt, with limited authority, and inclined to violate the law. 
Based on data from the Justice Initiative survey, the chart below compares the 
varying levels of confidence that different ethnic groups have in the police force. 
Roma have very similar rates of confidence in the police as ethnic Bulgarians—though 
both are relatively low—whereas Turkish people express more confidence.
The Bulgarian household survey included questions that could be used to 
develop a scored rating of confidence in police. On a scale based on 10, the scores 
averaged 5.2, indicating that public confidence in police among the population was 
not particularly high.
Average confidence in police, by ethnic group
Bulgarians Roma Other (including Turks)
Confidence in police 
(scored from zero to 10)
5.0 4.9 7.1
Note:  Differences are statistically significant, overall (p < 0.01), but only because of the much higher 
approval rating of the “other” group. Differences between Bulgarians and Roma participants are 
not statistically significant.
Participants in the Roma focus groups expressed skepticism about the police. 
They characterized the police force as an inefficient, corrupt organization that has no 
impact on crime problems. Participants said they would rarely call on police patrols 
to resolve a crime or a crisis situation and would rarely bring charges as victims. They 
believe the police are biased against them. Crime victim surveys show that 75 percent 
of the crimes committed against Roma are not reported to the police, whereas unre-
ported crimes against ethnic Bulgarians average 57 percent.111 
Hungary
Among the respondents to the household survey carried out in Hungary, there was 
widespread support for strong police tactics, among both non-Roma and Roma popu-
lations: 88 percent of all respondents said there should be more and continuous 
checks by police in public places.
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At the same time, community focus groups in Hungary revealed a generally 
negative view of current policing. Non-Roma participants emphasized concerns about 
police corruption, inefficiency, lack of physical and mental fitness, and lack of legal 
training. These opinions were based on limited personal involvement with the police. 
Roma focus groups also revealed negative attitudes, although, to some extent, of a 
different character. Unlike non-Roma, Roma participants reported that they had often 
been stopped in the street for what they felt were racist reasons and had been sub-
jected to what they felt was disrespectful treatment. Unanimously, Roma interviewees 
said they believe that the Hungarian police are racist in their stop practices (a view 
shared by some non-Roma, too). The Roma were also critical of police corruption and 
concerned about the poor physical appearance of police officers. 
Spain
A recent national survey in Spain suggests a generally positive view of policing among 
the general population.112 Only 11 percent of respondents felt that ineffective police 
were to blame for the crime rate in Spain. The same survey found that, when encoun-
tering a patrol of the National Police Corps, 80 percent thought the officers were help-
ful, and 72 percent thought they inspired confidence. The ratings for the municipal 
police were 78 percent and 67 percent, respectively. Overall, public perceptions of 
the police suggest that, in general, the four main tiers of policing are rated more 
positively than negatively by the public. The National Police Corps inspires the most 
confidence, followed by the Civil Guard, the police of the autonomous regions, and 
finally the municipal police forces.
Yet, as illustrated by the focus group data collected for this study, views of the 
police differ among ethnic groups. Non-minority Spanish participants did not express 
concerns about the police. Among minority participants, however—both Roma and 
immigrant—there was a fear of police attention and surveillance. The interview-
ees based their comments on their first-hand experiences—which, in some cases, 
included disrespectful or aggressive treatment. This view toward police was particu-
larly pronounced among the Roma participants, who felt they were more prone to 
surveillance and arrest in connection with drugs—a stereotype that they felt colored 
the police perception of all Roma people, collectively. It is interesting to note that 
interview participants from immigrant groups held a more positive view of the Span-
ish police than of the police in their countries of origin. 
Appendix C:
Is Ethnic Profiling an Effective 
Tactic?
Some police officials and analysts argue that ethnic profiling can be an effective way to 
target criminals. Such a case might be made, for example, if there was evidence that 
a specific ethnic or racial group was more involved in a particular type of crime than 
others; under such circumstances, it might make sense to seek out people from this 
more “criminal” group and target them with stops, searches and other police tactics. 
This argument should not be dismissed casually—indeed it is essential to evaluate 
such a claim. However, the argument finds little support in the available evidence. In 
fact, much available evidence suggests that ethnic profiling may actually harm police 
efforts to solve crime problems.
 For example, in the United States, suport for ethnic profiling might be based 
on a prison population that substantially overrepresents ethnic and racial minorities, 
which some may see as evidence of higher rates of criminality in minority popula-
tions (though explanations for this overrepresentation are complex and likely include 
racism within the criminal justice system).113 
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According to research in the United States by Harris Interactive, in a number 
of cases in which statistics are available, higher targeting of minorities is associated 
both with lower hit rates and with arrest rates that are no better than those for whites. 
For example, data on stop and search activities in New York during the 1990s showed 
a substantial overrepresentation of blacks and Latinos, but arrest rates were actually 
lower for these two groups than they were for whites. In 1999, the U.S. Customs 
Service also provided an instructive example. Following the service’s admission of 
racial profiling—it introduced significant reforms in its stop-and-search procedures. 
Race was eliminated as a factor in considering suspicion, and the service focused 
instead on suspicious behaviors. In 2000, having abandoned racial profiling, the 
Customs Service conducted 70 percent fewer searches, and their hit rates improved 
from approximately 5 percent to more than 15 percent.114
This well-documented example suggests that a reliance on ethnicity as a marker 
of suspicion probably does little, if anything, to enhance the effectiveness of police 
tactics and may even reduce police effectiveness. By contrast, there is much stronger 
evidence that behavioral factors, coupled with a strong emphasis on police intelli-
gence, provide more important clues to the likely involvement of a person in criminal 
activity.115
The existing evidence raises broader questions about the general effectiveness 
of stops, identity checks, or searches in reducing crime or detecting criminals. For 
example, British research suggests that searches are not particularly effective at detect-
ing or preventing crime. Research in the United States on raids—perhaps the most 
intrusive of police tactics associated with racial profiling—indicates that this tactic 
may provide only short-term reductions in crime. Police strategies that rely heavily 
on aggressive and intrusive policing tactics, such as “zero tolerance” policing—the 
targeted policing of low-level disorders in “problem” areas in an effort to prevent 
more serious crime—must also be viewed with skepticism. Recent research casts 
increasing doubt on the significance of the relationship of low-level disorder to more 
serious crime problems.116 Although the zero-tolerance approach has been credited 
by some with helping reduce crime rates in New York City—where the activities of 
black youths were targeted—crime dropped across all major cities in the United States 
during the 1990s. Similar reductions in crime were also found in some police depart-
ments (in San Diego and Boston, for example) that practiced community policing—an 
approach that is diametrically opposite zero tolerance.
Finally, an assessment of the effectiveness of ethnic profiling must include the 
broader context of police-community relations, particularly in communities dispro-
portionately scrutinized by police. Ethnic profiling can affect the public’s willingness 
to cooperate with the police—a critical factor in effective police work. Research in the 
United Kingdom and the United States establishes that unsatisfactory contact can 
negatively affect public confidence in the police, both for those directly interacting 
with police and for their family, friends, and associates.117 Research has shown that 
bad treatment by the police is associated with lower level of cooperation.118 Worse 
still, intrusive and apparently discriminatory policing can increase crime and disorder 
through civil unrest. In 2005, the accidental deaths of two youths who were alleg-
edly pursued by police triggered extensive rioting across immigrant areas of France. 
In 1992, riots broke out in Los Angeles in response to the televised beating of a 
black motorist and the subsequent failure to convict the officers involved. In 1981, 
in London’s Brixton neighborhood, disorder followed a law enforcement operation 
that involved heavy-handed policing and widespread searches of black youths on 
the streets.
A significant body of research indicates that public satisfaction with police 
behavior is higher when stops include polite and courteous treatment, a clear expla-
nation for the stop, and less intrusive practices (without searches, for example).119 It is 
also important to note that when police managers make a significant effort to promote 
respectful treatment and exercise sanctions against problem officers, it may lead to 
more respectful treatment of the public by police.120
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Appendix D: 
Survey Methods in
Bulgaria and Hungary
Bulgarian Survey
Vitosha Research, a sociological research agency, conducted the household survey 
with face-to-face interviews at the end of November 2005—a time of year in which 
many Roma who are seasonal workers or who spend summers in villages relocate 
to urban areas. The size of the main sample was 1,202. Additionally, there was a 
booster sample of 534 Roma. The targeted general population was Bulgarians age 15 
and older. 
The first stage of sampling was based on the list of electoral sections from the 
last presidential election. The selection of electoral sections was based on systematic 
random selection. The main purpose was to ensure a random selection of starting 
points, which were used in the selection of respondents in the second stage. The 
number of clusters (electoral sections) for the sample was 134. The actual selection 
of respondents was based on random route sampling.
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The booster sample was developed in two steps. In the first step, 100 localities 
(in all 28 administrative regions of the country) were randomly selected. In each of 
these localities, the research team used sociological, census, and police information 
to determine whether there was a concentrated Roma population. All booster sample 
interviews were conducted in Roma neighborhoods. 
The persons interviewed were
 at least 15 years of age;
 citizens of the country; 
 permanent residents of the household (persons who actually live there, regard-
less of whether they are administratively registered as living elsewhere);
 the only member of the household interviewed;
 interviewed individually without disturbances or suggestions from anyone 
else.
The response rate for the main survey was 79 percent; for the booster sample, 
the response rate 94 percent. Analysis of the data incorporated a weighting variable, 
based on age and gender distributions.
Hungarian Survey
The Hungarian survey questions were included during the regular, face-to-face omni-
bus survey carried out by TÁRKI in September 2005. The survey involved a single, 
nationally representative sample of 1,047 residents age 18 and older.
The survey sample involved multistage probability methods. In the first stage, 
localities were chosen within counties. In the second stage, the respondents were 
chosen from the localities with simple random sampling. When creating the sample 
of localities, a universe was made with counties as a first strata and type of settlements 
as a second. Localities were then chosen from within strata using random sampling. 
As a general principle, Budapest and all county seats (19) were included in the sam-
ple. For each county, one additional town and at least one village were selected. After 
creating the locality sample, the specific respondents for each locality were specified. 
The survey used sampling of preselected addresses based on names and addresses 
obtained from the central registry and electoral office.
The number of wrong addresses (due to relocation, death, etc.) and the number 
of refused interviews were greater than expected. In total, 1,047 interviews were real-
ized from a starting sample of 2,227 addresses. Excluding ineligible addresses, the 
overall response rate was 52 percent.
Final data were weighted according to social-demographic data from the national 
census of 2001, specifically in relation to gender, age, type of settlement, and level 
of education.
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Appendix E: 
Bulgarian Multivariate Models 
of Stops
This appendix provides results from a series of models that inform the analyses pre-
sented elsewhere in this report. The first two of these are logistic regression models. 
The third is an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) model.
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Logistic regression: Experience of vehicle stop
 B S.E. Wald d.f. Sig. Exp(B)
Age –0.02 0.01 12.86 1 0.00 0.98
Female –1.61 0.22 55.55 1 0.00 0.20
High school completed 0.64 0.29 4.69 1 0.03 1.89
Unemployed 0.51 0.29 3.00 1 0.08 1.66
Vehicle ownership 2.91 0.32 83.53 1 0.00 18.32
Goes out every week 0.44 0.22 4.21 1 0.04 1.56
Urban area 0.29 0.26 1.25 1 0.26 1.33
Bulgarian in Bulgarian only neighborhood 12.56 4 0.01
Bulgarian in mixed neighborhood –0.09 0.30 0.09 1 0.77 0.92
Roma in mixed neighborhood 0.54 0.42 1.67 1 0.20 1.72
Roma in Roma-only neighborhood –1.13 0.47 5.84 1 0.02 0.32
Other ethnic group 0.15 0.36 0.18 1 0.67 1.16
Constant –1.73 0.65 7.05 1 0.01 0.18
Notes:  Nagelkerke R Square = 0.387
   N = 1.619
Logistic regression: Experience of pedestrian stop
 B S.E. Wald d.f. Sig. Exp(B)
Age –0.03 0.01 14.24 1 0.00 0.97
Female –1.12 0.22 25.96 1 0.00 0.33
High school completed –0.10 0.29 0.12 1 0.72 0.90
Unemployed 0.00 0.25 0.00 1 1.00 1.00
Vehicle ownership 0.39 0.23 2.74 1 0.10 1.47
Goes out every week –0.01 0.23 0.00 1 0.97 0.99
Urban area 0.65 0.27 5.64 1 0.02 1.91
Bulgarian in Bulgarian only neighborhood 33.64 4 0.00
Bulgarian in mixed neighborhood –0.24 0.44 0.29 1 0.59 0.79
Roma in mixed neighborhood 1.59 0.35 20.63 1 0.00 4.90
Roma in Roma-only neighborhood 0.50 0.37 1.84 1 0.17 1.66
Other ethnic group –0.33 0.57 0.33 1 0.57 0.72
Constant –0.90 0.64 1.97 1 0.16 0.41
Notes:  Nagelkerke R Square = 0.180
   N = 1.633
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ANCOVA model: Public confidence in police
Source Sum of squares d.f. Mean square F Significance
Corrected model 6,704 12 0.559 7,705 0.000
Intercept 15,958 1 15.958 220,088 0.000
Age 0,126 1 0.126 1,742 0.187
Unemployed 0,249 1 0.249 3,437 0.064
High school 0,203 1 0.203 2,803 0.094
Sex 0,100 1 0.100 1,377 0.241
Ethnic group 3,507 2 1.754 24,186 0.000
Urban area 0,306 1 0.306 4,220 0.040
Neighborhood type 0,284 2 0.142 1,957 0.142
Stopped for bribe 0,019 1 0.019 0,263 0.608
Bad stop experience 0,609 2 0.304 4,199 0.015
Error 113,472 1,565 0.073
Total 538,182 1,578
Total corrected 120,175 1,577    
Notes:  R Square = 0.056 (adjusted R Square = 0.049) 
   N = 1.578
Appendix F:
Further Analysis and Research
The research relied on surveys, focus groups, and interviews to explore patterns of 
ethnic disadvantage, effectiveness, and public and police perceptions of police stops. 
Other methodologies would further increase our knowledge of the practice of police 
stops in the study countries. Table 10 highlights the range of research strategies avail-
able, including those applied in this study. The sections that follow list opportunities 
for further research.
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TABLE 10. 
Research and monitoring tools for asking key questions relating to police 
stops and ethnicity
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understood
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Disparities in stop rates ** * * *(*)121
Ethnic profiling * * * **
Police treatment * * *
Public confidence in policing * *
Problem police officers * * ** **
Police deployment * * ** **
Productivity (e.g. arrests) * * *
Effectiveness (crime reduction) * * **
Notes:  Grey shading = Methods used in the Justice Initiative research in Bulgaria, Hungary, and 
Spain
   * = at best, can provide suggestive research evidence; ** = at best, can provide strong research 
evidence 
Analysis of Internal Police Monitoring Data 
As discussed previously, internal police monitoring allows for the generation of statis-
tics to assess both ethnic disparity and the productiveness of police stops. It relies on a 
system of monitoring and tracking ethnic data for each stop, identity check, or search. 
Ethnic monitoring data in England and Wales can shed light on ethnic patterns of 
stopping, including these patterns’ relationship to crime fighting objectives.
Police forces in England and Wales are mandated by law to produce annual 
statistics on ethnic minorities in the criminal justice system, including those who 
experience stops and searches. This data can be used to explore the relationships 
between location, search productivity, and ethnic disparity in searching, as shown in 
the following example:
Arrest rates from searches by rate of minority overrepresentation in searches 
(compared to residential census population) across 42 police force areas in 
England and Wales in 2003/2004 
Although the graph provides only a descriptive picture and should not be used 
to infer causation, it reveals that, as rates of ethnic disparity in police searches increase 
(in other words, as proportionally more ethnic minorities than whites are searched), 
arrest rates tend to decrease. On the face of it, this finding provides little support for 
the idea that ethnic profiling is an effective crime-fighting strategy and instead sug-
gests that, in fact, ethnic profiling is counterproductive to fighting crime.
External Benchmarking Studies to Measure the 
Extent of Ethnic Profiling
External benchmarking studies attempt to find an appropriate ethnic profile against 
which to compare patterns of police-stopping activity (accounting for demographic, 
lifestyle, and lawbreaking differences among ethnic groups). Census data and other 
population estimates rarely indicate the actual population that might be the target 
for a police stop. External benchmarking studies are often highly technical, and even 
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good studies sometimes fail to fully resolve debates about the existence of ethnic 
profiling. 
A study focused on the Moscow metro system shows very clear examples of 
ethnic profiling by the police.
The study was carried out by the Justice Initiative with Lamberth Consulting 
and JURIX, a Russian human rights NGO. It examined ethnic profiling by police 
within 15 metro stations in Moscow.122 The study first created a benchmark percentage 
of individuals of non-Slavic ethnicity passing through each of the stations. The value 
of this benchmark was that it looked only at those persons who were “available” to be 
stopped by the police, and so it controlled for lifestyle differences that might affect 
the likelihood of metro use. By contrast, a measure based simply on the residential 
population of Moscow would not have accounted for ethnic differences in use of the 
metro system.
A second measure was created to account for the ethnic breakdown of actual 
police stops carried out at the same 15 stations and matched to the same times of day 
as the benchmarking sample. 
Comparing the numbers of stops with the benchmark of metro users showed 
that ethnic minorities, although they comprised only 5 percent of the riders on the 
metro system, accounted for more than one-half of the people stopped by police. 
In other words, non-Slavs were on average 22 times more likely to be stopped than 
Slavs—a clear indication of ethnic profiling among police officers.
Studies on Effectiveness of Police Stops
A final possibility for further research is to develop sophisticated methodological stud-
ies that compare the impact on crime of stops, identity checks, and searches with 
the impact of enhanced stop practices (for example, those that rely on intelligence, 
target hot spots, and analyze crime patterns). These studies may provide insight into 
an approach to police stops that will not place an unnecessary burden on law-abiding 
members of the public but will produce maximum gains for the police and public in 
reducing crime. 
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